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Slobodan Milošević has the infamous honour of being
the first post-World War II former head of state to be
brought before and tried by an international criminal tri-
bunal.1 As noted by Human Rights Watch, “the trial of
Milosevic marked an end of the era when being a head
of state meant immunity from prosecution. Since then
other former heads of state, including Saddam Hussein
and Charles Taylor, have been brought to justice”
(Human Rights Watch 2006, p. 1).
It is difficult to envision a more complex trial than the
trial of Slobodan Milošević. Not only were there many
legal issues in respect of the proceedings—such as Miloše-
vić’s former head of state status, his decision to represent
himself, and his poor health—but also three separate trials
were to be conducted together into one proceeding,
encompassing four armed conflicts, those that unfolded in
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and finally
Kosovo. The last of these involved the participation of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in its first
armed conflict.
This article guides the reader through the major
phases of the trial. “Guide” is an important word in this
context, and one that is chosen carefully. The immensity
and complexity of the case renders it somewhat impene-
trable to a person who is approaching it for the first time
and who possesses a sincere interest in actually delving
into the labyrinth of proceedings. It is akin to a moun-
taineer standing at the base of a mountain, looking up,
and not being able to see the top. A guide would be ad-
visable. This guide to the Milošević trial is therefore
intended to guide the reader from the start of the pro-
ceedings to the very end, while highlighting and explain-
ing the more significant events. Each of these events can
then be examined in more detail, through reference to
the primary documentation, which is available on the* Correspondence: dawsongrant@hotmail.com
2Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Johan de Wittlaan
32, 2517 JR The Hague, The Netherlands
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Due to the ultimate lack of resolution of the trial fol-
lowing the death of Milošević, it is possible that a case
of this size and complexity will never be seen again. But
the unique and novel circumstances that made up the
proceedings served in many ways as an experimental
cauldron of procedural and substantive legal innova-
tions, which should be—and indeed already have
been—exploited for future trials of this kind. With the
passing of time and the initiation of proceedings against
other former or serving heads of state, new generations
of lawyers and academics may not immediately realise
how unlikely the Milošević proceedings seemed in the
1990s and how fundamentally they impacted on inter-
national criminal justice. To address this, the article pro-
vides a condensed description of the main phases of the
proceedings. It will first set out the context in which the
Milošević proceedings began, in order to provide a de-
tailed analysis of the pre-trial phase and trial phase, be-
fore describing the final stages of the proceedings.Prologue: from the former Yugoslavia to The
Hague
While the rise and fall of Slobodan Milošević and the
surrounding geopolitical events have been described
elsewhere many times (see, e.g. Silber and Little 1996;
Judah 2002; Stephen 2004), a briefly sketched overview
of the principal events that led to the proceedings
against Milošević may assist those readers not immedi-
ately familiar with them.
Slobodan Milošević, who was of ethnic Montenegrin
origin, was born in Serbia on 20 August 1941. He grew
up in the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
(SFRY) under Tito during the Cold War. A lawyer by
training, he was appointed in 1984 as head of the
Belgrade Communist Party and, 2 years later, head of the
Serbian Communist Party (Silber and Little 1996,s article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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On 24 April 1987, Milošević travelled to Kosovo Polje
where he gave his famous speech to a group of Kosovo
Serbs, who were complaining of mistreatment by the
Kosovo Albanians. Milošević entered the agitated crowds
of Kosovo Serbs and made his famous statement, “No
one should dare to beat you!” This incident symbolised
what would become the return of a certain type of
Serbian nationalism throughout the 1990s. In 1989,
Kosovo’s autonomy was revoked, and Milošević was
appointed President of the Presidency of the Socialist
Republic of Serbia. On 28 June 1989, Milošević ad-
dressed a crowd of approximately one million Serbs on
the historic battlefield of Gazimestan, 600 years after the
Battle of Kosovo. It was the pinnacle, in many ways, of
his political life, and he emerged as the symbolic leader
of all Serbs. As events would unfold, Kosovo would
prove to be for Milošević the source of his rise and also
of his ultimate fall (Silber and Little 1996, pp. 42–47;
Judah 2002, pp. 50–54; Stephen 2004, pp. 37–39;
Human Rights Watch 2006, p. 7).
The path to the courtroom
From death to birth
The SFRY did not survive the passage to the 21st cen-
tury. Its fairly rapid disintegration began in the 1990s.
After the adoption of the new Constitution of Serbia in
1990, Milošević was elected to the newly established Of-
fice of the President of Serbia in multi-party elections.
One after another, Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina declared their independence from the
SFRY. In 1991, the wars in Slovenia (albeit brief ) and
Croatia began, along with the siege of Vukovar. In 1992,
Bosnia followed its neighbours on the road to independ-
ence through a referendum and then war, with Sarajevo
falling under siege and the setting up of detention camps
in April. Relayed through the mass media, these events’
dramatic images led to public outcry. Action was
demanded (Silber and Little 1996, pp. 37–41; Stephen
2004, pp. 82–85; Human Rights Watch 2006, p. 7).2
Later that year, the United Nations Security Council
determined under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter that the
situation in the former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to
international peace and security and passed Resolution
771, declaring that individuals who committed or or-
dered the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions were individually responsible for such
breaches and calling on the international community to
cooperate in the collection of evidence of those crimes.
The Security Council then asked the UN Secretary-
General to assemble and task a group of experts to
examine this evidence. When the Secretary-General re-
ported back to the Security Council, the Council decidedto request him to make a proposal for the establishment
of an international criminal tribunal. On 25 May 1993,
after having received this proposal, the Security Council
acted under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter to pass Reso-
lution 827. Thus was born the ICTY (see generally
UNSC Res 827 1993).3
As the ICTY was taking its first steps, the armed con-
flicts in the SFRY continued. In July 1995, the UN Safe
Haven at Srebrenica was taken by Bosnian Serb forces,
and thousands of Bosnian Muslims were executed. The
following month, NATO began to bomb Serb positions,
and Croatian forces drove the Serb population from the
Krajina. In November, the Dayton Peace Accords were
signed by the warring factions, ending the active hostil-
ities in the conflicts (Silber and Little 1996, pp. 265–387;
Judah 2002, pp. 109–126; Stephen 2004, pp. 52–76;
Human Rights Watch 2006, pp. 7–9).
From bombardment to indictment
During the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, the strategy
of the Kosovo Albanian leadership in the Serbian prov-
ince of Kosovo was one of non-violent civil disobedi-
ence. On the other hand, through the police forces of
the Serbian Ministry of the Interior (MUP), Belgrade
gradually increased its political grip on Kosovo (Judah
2002, pp. 61–98; Human Rights Watch 2006, pp. 9–10).
The Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) was the dom-
inant political party of the Kosovo Albanians and was
headed by Ibrahim Rugova, the “President” of the
“Republic of Kosova”, which had been created on 19
October 1991 when the “parliament” confirmed a 22
September 1991 “Resolution on the Independence and
Sovereignty of Kosovo” and subsequent referendum. A
parallel government in Kosovo therefore existed along-
side the one under the control of Belgrade (Judah 2002,
pp. 61–98,109–134).
In July 1997, after having served two terms as Presi-
dent of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević was elected President
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (ICTY case
Information Sheet; Stephen 2004, p. 138). The Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) became increasingly organised.
In 1998, the Serbian forces began a major crackdown on
the KLA which, considering the balance of powers, de-
cided to wage a guerrilla war. As the Serbian authorities
claimed it was simply rooting out Albanian terrorists,
the civilian casualties mounted. When these events were
related to the West by the media and also by inter-
national observers on the ground in Kosovo, public sen-
timent was engaged. The concern was to prevent
another Bosnia (Judah 2002, pp. 135–163).
Talks between NATO, the Organisation for Security
and Co-operation in Europe, Serbs, and the Kosovo
Albanians were held on and off throughout 1998 and
1999 but led to few results on the ground. The threat of
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45 Kosovo Albanians and 9 KLA members were killed in
the village of Račak. The circumstances of this incident
remain shrouded in mystery to this day. Some called it a
legitimate police action to eliminate from the village ter-
rorists who were responsible for an attack on the police
a few days earlier. Others characterised it as a massacre.
Nevertheless, the NATO countries used Račak and the
fact that the Albanian delegation, unlike the Serbs,
signed the Rambouillet Agreement, as a major impetus
for the use of air strikes against the FRY, which began
on March 1999 and continued for 78 days into June
(Judah 2002, pp. 193–285; Stephen 2004, pp. 140–145;
see also UNSC Res 1244 1999).
On 22 May 1999, during the bombing of Serb posi-
tions in Kosovo and various targets in Belgrade itself,
ICTY Prosecutor Louise Arbour submitted an indict-
ment against Slobodan Milošević—as well as Milan
Milutinović, the President of Serbia; Nikola Šainović, the
FRY Deputy Prime Minster; Dragoljub Ojdanić, Chief of
the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army (VJ); and Vlajko
Stojiljković, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia—-
for alleged crimes committed in Kosovo (Prosecutor v.
Milošević, Milutinović, Šainović, Ojdanić, and Stojiljko-
vić 23 May 1999).4 On 24 May 1999, Judge David Hunt
confirmed the indictment (Prosecutor v. Milošević,
Milutinović, Šainović, Ojdanić, and Stojiljković 24 May
1999).5 On the same day, a warrant for the arrest of
Milošević was issued (Prosecutor v. Milošević 24 May
1999). On 26 May 1999, the ICTY Prosecutor “made her
announcement to the world” that Milošević, a serving
head of state, was indicted for war crimes and crimes
against humanity (Stephen 2004, p. 144).
From elections to detention
Shortly after Dayton, student protests resumed in 1996
and 1997 (Stephen 2004, p. 156; Judah 2002, p. 306). By
the time of the cease fire between NATO and the FRY
in June 1999 and the run-up to the federal elections,
several political parties were challenging Milošević: the
liberal opposition headed by Belgrade’s mayor, Zoran
Đinđić; the liberal nationalist Serbian Renewal Party,
headed by Vuk Drašković; and Vojislav Šešelj of the
Radical Party. It has been said that Milošević, amidst
continued protests, moved the elections from July 2000
to September 2000 to take advantage of the disorganisa-
tion of the opposition (Stephen 2004, pp. 157–158;
Judah 2002, p. 306).
Vojislav Koštunica, a law professor considered to be a
“compromise candidate”, won the election, but Milošević
disputed the results. The election commission an-
nounced new figures, thus necessitating a second round
of voting. Koštunica refused to accept this, and a new
flurry of protests ensued (Stephen 2004, p. 159). On 5October 2000, protestors took the federal parliamentary
building, and Milošević finally stepped down from office
2 days later. Koštunica, however, refused to transfer
Milošević to the ICTY, citing various legal objections,
and announced that Milošević would stay in the presi-
dential palace and be tried in the FRY on corruption
charges. In April 2001, Milošević was arrested, removed
from the presidential palace, and incarcerated in
Belgrade District Prison (Stephen 2004, pp. 160–162;
Human Rights Watch 2006, p. 10). It is at this point that
the US decided to make monetary aid to the FRY contin-
gent upon Milošević being transferred to The Hague
(Stephen 2004, p. 164; Judah 2002, p. 305).
The transfer of Milošević to the United Nations
Detention Unit (UNDU) in The Hague is poignantly de-
scribed by Chris Stephen:
On 28 June 2001, […] Serbia’s cabinet held a special
early morning session presided over by prime minister
Zoran Djindjić. The Yugoslav President, Vojislav
Kostunica, was not informed of the meeting. There
was only one item on the agenda and agreement was
reached in a matter of minutes. Orders were sent out
of the room to the commanders of a police unit
which had been briefed on its very special mission the
night before. The prison governor was contacted, and
he relayed to Milošević the news that he was going to
be taken away that evening. […] At 6 p.m. he was
sitting alone in his cell when the prison governor
came to tell him to collect his things and prepare to
leave. “Where are you taking me?” he asked. “To The
Hague,” the governor replied.
[…] Instead of a police escort, the governor himself
led the former president down the corridor. After
going a little way, he stopped and said: “Warden,
what’s this? It’s not right, this is a kidnapping.” The
governor insisted they keep walking, guiding him
through the prison and out into the yard where there
was a police van with the back door open. Milošević
got in […].
The transfer was conducted by the police of Serbia,
with no involvement of either the Yugoslav federal
police or the military which were under the control
of President Kostunica. He would later claim that the
operation was illegal because only the state has the
power to transfer a prisoner out of the country.
But Serbia’s prime minister, with a billion lifeline at
stake, was beyond considering such niceties.
Milošević was driven through Belgrade’s early
morning traffic to a police base with a yard large
enough for a helicopter to land. […] Getting out of
the police van, Milošević said: “Well done, you lot,
you can take your money now.”
Abtahi and Dawson Journal of International Humanitarian Action  (2016) 1:4 Page 4 of 35A helicopter was waiting, with two men and one
woman, […] standing by its side door. One of the men
was a Hague investigator, the other a Dutch police
officer and the woman was a translator. Asked which
language he spoke, Milošević replied, “Serbian,” and
his war crimes indictment was read to him, the
interpreter translating from English. This took some
time, and Milošević lit a cigarette while he listened.
Finally the investigator said: “I am arresting you. You
are now under the jurisdiction of the Hague
Tribunal.” He was helped aboard the helicopter, and
someone folded his raincoat and placed it under his
seat. He looked up, and called to the pilot and
co-pilot: “How are you, lads?” The pilot replied: “All
right, Mr President.” Milošević turned to the governor
and asked: “Warden, where is my raincoat?” These
turned out to be his last words on Yugoslav soil
(Stephen 2004, pp. 165–167).6
Shortly after Milošević was transferred to The Hague
and while he was awaiting the commencement of his
trial, he passed his 60th birthday in the UNDU. His wife,
daughter-in-law, and grandson were granted 3-day visas
for the occasion (BBC 2001a, BBC 2001b).
In the courtroom
ICTY Trial Chambers are composed of three Judges
(Statute of ICTY, Art. 12), and until 16 November 2001,
the bench in the pre-trial proceedings in the Milošević,
which was assigned to Trial Chamber III, consisted of
Presiding Judge Richard May, Judge Patrick Robinson,
and Judge Mohammed El Habib Fassi Fihri. On 23
November 2001, the President of the ICTY assigned
Judge O-Gon Kwon to replace Judge Fassi Fihri, whose
term had expired (Prosecutor v. Milošević 23 November
2001a).
The initial appearance of Milošević was a widely
watched event and was described by one Senior Legal
Officer as such:
On 3 July 2001, the eyes of the world were on
Courtroom I of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. Slobodan
Milosevic, the former President of Yugoslavia, was
about to make his initial court appearance to enter a
plea on charges of war crimes and crimes against
humanity in relation to the events in Kosovo during
1998–1999. As the courtroom officials entered
promptly, those of us not directly responsible for the
conduct of the proceedings felt proud to be part of
history in the making. The Chamber of three Judges,
presided over by Judge Richard May, entered
moments afterwards. In a petulant mood, Slobodan
Milosevic refused to acknowledge the authority of the
court and, using a tactic that would continuethroughout the trial, addressed Judge May as “Mr.
May”. Later, in response to a question about
procedure, he replied tartly: “That’s your problem”.
Judge May refused to rise to the bait, although from
my position at the Registry bench, I could picture his
raised eyebrow and hear the rhythmic tapping of pen
on notebook, the only outward sign of irritation he
would ever display (Featherstone 2006, p. 301).
Milošević’s refusal to address the Judges in the cus-
tomary manner was not the only manifestation of his de-
fiance to the authority and legitimacy of the ICTY.
Other examples included refusing to make written fil-
ings, although there were exceptions to this refusal, es-
pecially during the Defence phase of the case (see, e.g.
Prosecutor v. Milošević 8 July 2005, p. 2).7 He also re-
fused to enter pleas of guilty or not guilty to the charges
against him during his initial appearance on 3 July 2001
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 3 July 2001b, T.4). Pursuant to
Rule 62(A)(iv) of the Rules of Procedures and Evidence
(“Rules”),8 the Trial Chamber entered pleas of “not
guilty” on all counts against him.
The pre-trial phase: testing the waters
Self-representation, part I
At his initial appearance for the Kosovo Indictment on 3
July 2001, Milošević informed the Trial Chamber, both
in writing and orally, that he did not want to be repre-
sented by a lawyer (Prosecutor v. Milošević 3 July 2001c,
Registry pp. 3371–3372; 3 July 2001b, T.1–2). At the first
status conference on 30 August 2001, the Trial Chamber
noted that Milošević was entitled to represent himself
and rejected the Prosecution’s suggestion that it should
impose defence counsel upon him. According to the
Trial Chamber, “the Accused ha[d] a right to counsel,
but he also ha[d] a right not to have counsel” (Prosecu-
tor v. Milošević 30 August 2001a, T.15–18). At the time,
the health condition of Milošević was not an issue.
Challenging the chamber: appointment of the Amici Curiae
and of Legal Associates
On 31 August 2001, the Trial Chamber issued an order
inviting the Registrar of the Tribunal to designate
Amicus Curiae. In doing so, the Trial Chamber recog-
nised that, pursuant to Rule 74,9 the appointment of ex-
perienced lawyers to assist Milošević was in the interests
of securing a fair trial (Prosecutor v. Milošević 30
August 2001b). The Trial Chamber stated that the pur-
pose of the Amicus Curiae was not to represent an ac-
cused who had chosen to defend himself pursuant to
Article 21(4)(d) of the Statute but to assist the Trial
Chamber in the “proper determination of the case”
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 30 August 2001b). Such assist-
ance could take the form of making any submissions
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other pre-trial motions, making any submissions or ob-
jections to evidence properly open to him during the
trial proceedings, cross-examining witnesses as appropri-
ate, drawing to the attention of the Trial Chamber any
exculpatory or mitigating evidence, and acting in any
other way considered appropriate in order to secure a
fair trial (Prosecutor v. Milošević 30 August 2001b, p. 2).
On 6 September 2001, the Registrar appointed three
lawyers to act as Amici Curiae.10 One of their main
functions was to prepare out-of-court written submis-
sions, whereas two of them would be more involved with
the day-to-day proceedings of the trial, both in and out
of court.11 The Registrar was directed to provide to the
Amici Curiae all information, including confidential, that
was provided to Milošević (Prosecutor v. Milošević 19
September 2001).
The role of the Amici Curiae in the Milošević case was
innovative in that they functioned, in practical terms, as
stand-by counsel to a pro se accused. They were seated
in court on a daily basis, although not directly at the
bench where defence counsel would normally sit. Due to
the fact that Milošević refused to make written filings,
including responding to Prosecution motions for the ad-
mission of evidence, the Amici Curiae regularly made
written filings opposing these Prosecution motions,
much like a defence counsel would. They adopted a role
of identity of interest with Milošević and did not assume
the role of disinterested third parties appointed to assist
the Chamber only—although the positions they adopted
in their oral and written submission were aimed at en-
suring the fairness of the proceedings, from their own
professional point of view.
On 15 November 2001, the Trial Chamber issued an
order on Milošević’s request for the Registry to permit
him to meet with two lawyers to assist him. The Cham-
ber ordered that the two men would be considered to be
“legal advisors” to Milošević.12 The Trial Chamber also
ordered that Milošević would be entitled to communi-
cate fully and without restraint with them in accordance
with Rule 65 of the ICTY Rules of Detention (Prosecutor
v. Milošević 15 November 2001).13 In other words, Milo-
šević would enjoy attorney-client privilege with his two
Legal Associates.
The role of the Legal Associates throughout the pro-
ceedings was a significant one, even though they were
never seen within the courtroom and even though, in
general, they did not make written filings on behalf of
Milošević during the proceedings.
Challenging the ICTY: jurisdiction and legality
In August 2001, Milošević filed two motions challenging
the jurisdiction and legality of the ICTY (Prosecutor v.
Milošević, Milutinović, Šainović, Ojdanić, and Stojiljković9 August 2001; 30 August 2001), which were supple-
mented by the Amici Curiae (Prosecutor v. Milošević 16
August 2001; 19 October 2001; 13 September 2001). On 8
November 2001, the Trial Chamber issued its written de-
cision (Prosecutor v. Milošević 8 November 2001).14 In
rejecting the motions, the Trial Chamber considered sev-
eral issues.
The Amici Curiae and Milošević challenged the legal-
ity of the ICTY by arguing that the UN Security Council
was not empowered to establish an international crim-
inal court. The Trial Chamber noted, however, that
Article 41 of the UN Charter empowered the Security
Council to adopt measures to meet its obligation to
maintain or restore international peace and security. As
stated by the Trial Chamber in its decision:
The relevant provision is Article 41 of the Charter,
which empowers the Security Council to adopt
measures not involving the use of armed force to give
effect to its decisions in order to discharge its
obligation under Article 39 to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Article 41 lists
certain measures which may be taken by the Security
Council. It is perfectly clear that the list is not
exhaustive and that it is open to the Security Council
to adopt any measure other than those specifically
listed, provided it is a measure to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
… In the Chamber’s view, the establishment of the
International Tribunal with power to prosecute
persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law in the former
Yugoslavia, and with the obligation to guarantee fully
the rights of the accused, is, in the context of the
conflict in the country at that time, pre-eminently a
measure to restore international peace and security.
Indeed, the role of the International Tribunal in
promoting peace and reconciliation in the former
Yugoslavia is highlighted in Security Council
resolution 827 which established it. The Appeals
Chamber in the Tadić Jurisdiction Appeal arrived
at the same conclusion and concluded that “the
establishment of the International Tribunal falls
squarely within the powers of the Security Council
under Article 41” (Prosecutor v. Milošević 8
November 2001, paras. 6–7).
Second, Milošević argued that the creation of an ad
hoc tribunal with a focus on violations of international
law in one country targeted that country, corrupted just-
ice and law, and violated the most basic legal principles.
Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber noted that the Appeals
Chamber had held that ad hoc tribunals, and the ICTY
in particular, were permissible so long as they afforded
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Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. In this regard, the Trial Chamber noted
that Article 21 of the Statute afforded substantially the
same rights as Article 14 of the Covenant (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 8 November 2001, paras. 9–10).15
Third, the Amici Curiae impugned the independence
of the Prosecutor. In 1998, the Security Council urged
the Office of the Prosecutor “to begin gathering infor-
mation related to the violence in Kosovo that may fall
within its jurisdiction”. The Amici Curiae argued in
their brief that the Prosecutor lacked independence
and had thus violated Article 16(2) of the Statute. The
Trial Chamber held, however, that initiating an inves-
tigation at the behest of another is not indicative of a
lack of independence. A lack of independence would
exist where the assessment of evidence and the deci-
sion whether to indict an individual were based on
someone else’s instructions. Since there was no sug-
gestion that the Prosecutor had acted upon the in-
struction of any government, body, or any other
person in her decision to indict Milošević, there was
no failure of independence and thus no violation of
the Statute (Prosecutor v. Milošević 8 November 2001,
paras. 12–17).16
Fourth, there was an allegation of bias. The Amici Cu-
riae contended that the ICTY was incapable of provid-
ing Milošević with a fair trial or of protecting his
fundamental rights (Prosecutor v. Milošević 19 October
2001, pp. 7–8). Milošević argued that the “very psych-
ology of the enterprise is persecutorial” (Milošević
Motion 30 August 2001, pp. 7–8). The Trial Chamber
construed these arguments as an allegation of bias on
the part of the ICTY and of the Trial Chamber itself.
The Trial Chamber considered a decision of the
Appeals Chamber according to which there were three
means of establishing bias and found that only one was
relevant in the instant case: the test whether a reason-
able observer, properly informed, would reasonably
apprehend bias. The Trial Chamber dismissed the argu-
ment since neither the Amici Curiae nor Milošević had
met this test (Prosecutor v. Milošević 8 November
2001, paras. 18–22).17
Fifth, the Amici Curiae contended that the ICTY
lacked jurisdiction over Milošević because of his status
as the former President of the FRY. Article 7(2) of the
Statute provided, “The official position of any Accused
person, whether as Head of State or Government …
shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility
nor mitigate punishment” (Statute of ICTY, Art. 7(2)).
The Trial Chamber therefore held that there was no
basis for challenging this Article, “which at this time
reflects a rule of customary international law” (Pros-
ecutor v. Milošević 8 November 2001, paras. 26–34).Finally, the Amici Curiae argued that the ICTY lacked
jurisdiction because Milošević was surrendered unlaw-
fully: it was the government of Serbia that surrendered
him, even though the arrest warrant was directed to the
FRY (Prosecutor v. Milošević 19 October 2001, para.
15). The Amici Curiae also argued that, since the FRY
did not allow extradition of its citizens, the transfer of
Milošević was an abuse of process because the internal
procedures of the FRY had not been followed. In reject-
ing this challenge, the Trial Chamber relied on Rule 58,
which provided that “the obligations laid down in Article
29 of the Statute (which requires the cooperation of all
States) shall prevail over any legal impediment to the
surrender or transfer of the Accused … which may exist
under the national law or extradition treaties of the State
concerned” (Prosecutor v. Milošević 19 October 2001,
paras. 35–51).18
With Milošević’s challenges to the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal to try him dismissed, the proceedings now fo-
cused on preparing the case for trial.Scope of the indictments
The three indictments: Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo
Milošević was initially indicted along with other high-
level military and political leaders of the FRY and Serbia
for the events in Kosovo in the summer of 1999. On 5
September 2002, the Trial Chamber severed Milošević’s
trial from that of his co-accused, so that he could be
tried separately (Prosecutor v. Milošević, Milutinović,
Šainović, Ojdanić, and Stojiljković 5 September 2002).19
Milošević would be the subject of a trial devoted solely
to him, and his indicted associates would have to wait
another 4 years before their trial would even begin.20
On 29 October 2001, via an oral decision, the Trial
Chamber granted leave to amend the Kosovo Indict-
ment, confirming that the Second Amended Indictment
was the operative indictment for the Kosovo phase of
the proceedings (Prosecutor v. Milošević, Milutinović,
Šainović, Ojdanić, and Stojiljković 29 October 2001).21
In that indictment, Milošević was charged pursuant to
Article 7(1), individual criminal responsibility, and Art-
icle 7(3), superior criminal responsibility, with murder,
as a violation of laws or customs of war, and with four
crimes against humanity: deportation, other inhumane
acts (forcible transfer), murder, and persecution on polit-
ical, racial, and religious grounds.
In the autumn of 2001, following the election of Carla
Del Ponte as the new ICTY Prosecutor, Judge Almiro
Rodrigues confirmed the initial Croatia Indictment
against Milošević and Judge Richard May confirmed the
Bosnia Indictment against him (Prosecutor v. Milošević
8 October 2001; 22 November 2001). Both cases were
subsequently assigned by the President of the ICTY to
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2001; 23 November 2001b).
On 29 October 2001 (Motion Hearing 29 October
2001, T.123) and 11 December 2001 Hearing, 11 De-
cember 2001, T. 32 (Bosnia), Milošević made his initial
appearances on the Croatia and Bosnia indictments. Just
as with the Kosovo Indictment, Milošević refused to
enter pleas of guilty or not guilty.
These new indictments alleged that, from 1991 to
1995, Milošević was responsible for the furnishing of aid
and support to the Serb populations during the armed
conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and plotted with the Serb
leaders in those countries to secure Serb control over as
much territory as possible. The means by which this was
to be accomplished, as alleged by the Prosecution, was
the killing, torture, rape, and forcible displacement of
the non-Serb populations. Milošević was charged with
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, vio-
lations of the laws or customs of war, crimes against hu-
manity, and, in Bosnia, genocide.
More specifically, in the Croatia Indictment, Milošević
was charged pursuant to Article 7(1), individual criminal
responsibility, and Article 7(3), superior criminal respon-
sibility, with:
Article 2, Grave Breaches of the Geneva Convention of
1949: nine counts of wilful killing; unlawful confinement;
torture; wilfully causing great suffering; unlawful deport-
ation or transfer; and extensive destruction and appro-
priation of property not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly
Article 3, Violations of laws or customs of war: 13
counts of murder; torture; cruel treatment; wanton de-
struction of villages or devastation not justified by mili-
tary necessity; destruction or wilful damage done to
institutions dedicated to education or religion; plunder
of public or private property; attacks on civilians; de-
struction or wilful damage done to historic monuments
and institutions dedicated to education or religion; and
unlawful attacks on civilian objects
Article 5, Crimes against humanity: ten counts of perse-
cution on political, racial, or religious grounds; extermin-
ation; murder; imprisonment; torture; inhumane acts;
deportation; and inhumane acts (forcible transfers)22
As for the Bosnia Indictment, Milošević was charged
pursuant to Article 7(1), individual criminal responsibility,
and Article 7(3), superior criminal responsibility, with:
Article 2, Grave Breaches of the Geneva Convention of
1949: eight counts of wilful killing; unlawful
confinement; torture; wilfully causing great suffering;
unlawful deportation or transfer; and extensive
destruction and appropriation of property not justified
by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonlyArticle 3, Violations of laws or customs of war: nine
counts of murder; torture; cruel treatment; wanton
destruction of villages or devastation not justified by
military necessity; wilful destruction or wilful damage
done to historic monument and institutions dedicated
to education or religion; plunder of public or private
property; and attacks on civilians
Article 4, Genocide: two counts of genocide and
complicity in genocide.
Article 5, Crimes against humanity: ten counts of
persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds;
extermination; murder; imprisonment; torture;
inhumane acts; deportation; and inhumane acts
(forcible transfer)
Milošević was facing three massive indictments span-
ning three armed conflicts in the 1990s. What was to
occur next—the joinder of the indictments—affected the
course of the remainder of the proceedings.
Joinder of the indictments
On 27 November 2001, the Prosecution filed a motion
for joinder pursuant to Rule 49, in which it sought to
join the three indictments against Milošević into a single
trial (Prosecutor v. Milošević, Milutinović, Šainović,
Ojdanić, and Stojiljković 27 November 2001; Motion for
Joinder 10 December 2001).
The Prosecution asserted that the following consider-
ations supported its motion for joinder. First, it referred
to Rule 49, which provided that, “[t]wo or more crimes
may be joined in one indictment if the series of acts
committed together form the same transaction, and the
said crimes were committed by the same accused” (Rule
49 of the Rules, IT/32/Rev. 21 10 December 2009). A
“transaction” for these purposes was defined in Rule 2 as
a “number of acts or omissions, whether occurring as
one event or a number of events, at the same or differ-
ent locations and being part of a common scheme, strat-
egy or plan” (IT/32/Rev.44 10 December 2009). The
Prosecution therefore argued that the three indictments
concerned the same transaction in the context of a com-
mon scheme, strategy, or plan because Milošević’s over-
all conduct in attempting to create “a centralised Serbian
state encompassing the Serb-populated areas of Croatia
and Bosnia and Hercegovina, and all of Kosovo” (Pros-
ecutor v. Milošević, Milutinović, Šainović, Ojdanić, and
Stojiljković 27 November 2001, p. 5). The Prosecution
called the Trial Chamber’s attention to paragraph 6 of
the Croatia Indictment, paragraph 6 of the Bosnia In-
dictment, and paragraph 16 of the Kosovo Indictment,
all of which alleged the forcible removal of non-Serbs
from the territories in question. The Prosecution also ar-
gued that joinder of the three indictments would lead to
a more fair and expeditious trial for Milošević. In the
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and would provide a more consolidated trial timetable
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 27 November 2001, p. 4). With-
out joinder, Milošević would be litigating one trial, while
simultaneously confronting two pre-trial phases (Pros-
ecutor v. Milošević 27 November 2001, p. 15). Moreover,
having three trials instead of one would require repeated
testimony, and different trial chambers would have to
consider the degree to which evidence or findings from
one trial needed be incorporated into another (Prosecu-
tor v. Milošević 27 November 2001, p. 15). The Prosecu-
tion further argued that a single trial would promote
judicial economy (Prosecutor v. Milošević 27 November
2001, pp. 15–18). For example, witnesses testifying on
history or policy would not have to give evidence three
times (Prosecutor v. Milošević 27 November 2001, p. 17).
The Prosecution also submitted that the trauma to victims
would be lessened if they only needed to testify once
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 27 November 2001, p. 18), and
security concerns would be fewer if the witnesses only had
to travel to the ICTY once (Prosecutor v. Milošević 27
November 2001, p. 18). Finally, the Prosecution main-
tained that a single trial would avoid inconsistency. In a
joint trial, the same Trial Chamber would be deciding is-
sues of credibility and evaluating the evidence and there-
fore would have a better chance of avoiding conflicting
factual findings (Prosecutor v. Milošević 27 November
2001, pp. 18–19). A single trial would also obviate concern
about the appeal of one trial judgment on the merits,
while the second or third trial was still ongoing (Prosecu-
tor v. Milošević 27 November 2001, pp. 18-19).
In their response, the Amici Curiae noted that Milošević
did not recognise the ICTY and that there were therefore
no issues for the Amici Curiae to submit on this issue
on his behalf (Prosecutor v. Milošević 5 December
2001, p. 6). However, the Amici Curiae did point out
that the Trial Chamber would have to consider the ex-
treme scale of the single trial exercise and whether the
Chamber was able adequately to deal with it (Prosecutor
v. Milošević 5 December 2001, p. 6).
On 11 December 2001, having heard oral arguments
from both parties and the Amici Curiae (Motion Hearing
11 December 2001, T68 et seq), the Trial Chamber gave its
oral decision. The Chamber decided to join the Croatia
and Bosnia indictments, but refused to join the Kosovo
case with the others. In addition, the Kosovo case would
be heard first, with the joint Croatia and Bosnia trial
following later (Motion Hearing 11 December 2001,
T.145). Two days later, the Trial Chamber issued its
written decision on joinder (Prosecutor v. Milošević 13
December 2001). The Trial Chamber held that the es-
sence of the test under Rule 49 on joinder was the de-
termination of whether a “series of acts, committed
together, formed the same transaction” or was a part ofa common scheme, strategy, or plan and that, in exer-
cising its discretion under the Rule, it had taken into
account the entitlement of an accused to a fair hearing
under Article 21(2) of the Statute; the interests of justice,
which related to the accused as well as to the interests of
the Prosecution and the international community in the
trial of any accused charged with serious violations of
international humanitarian law; and judicial economy,
such as the avoidance of duplication of evidence and
the avoidance of hardship to witnesses (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 13 December 2001, paras. 28, 38–40).
The Prosecution was not satisfied with this decision
and sought review before the Appeals Chamber.
The Appeals Chamber reversed the decision of the
Trial Chamber. On 1 February 2002, the Appeals
Chamber ordered that the three indictments against
Milošević be tried together in one trial (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 1 February 2002). On 18 April 2002, the
Appeals Chamber issued its reasons. It held that Rule
49 did not require that the events in Kosovo were com-
mitted together with the events in Croatia and Bosnia
in order for all the trials to be joined (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 18 April 2002). In other words, a common
scheme, strategy, or plan could include the achieve-
ment of a long-term aim which, in the case of Miloše-
vić, was the forcible removal of the majority of the
non-Serb civilian population from areas that the Serb
authorities wished to establish (Prosecutor v. Milošević
18 April 2002, paras. 14, 20). Thus, Milošević would
face 66 counts of genocide, crimes against humanity,
and war crimes in a consolidated indictment of an un-
precedented scope and size.
However, to say that Milošević was facing 66 counts
does not adequately capture the size and scope of the
case against him (see Additional file 1).23 At the Tribu-
nal, “counts” are simply a textual means by which the
Prosecution organises “charges” in a written indictment.
A charge is the vehicle by which the Prosecution alleges
that an accused is responsible for a crime. In the indict-
ments, a single count often referred to crimes in dozens
of municipalities, cross-referenced to schedules attached
to the indictment. In addition, the same factual scenarios
are often charged under multiple counts. This all re-
sulted in a gargantuan puzzle of charges, which can be
estimated between 5000 and 6000 individual charges,
each of which exposed Milošević to criminal
responsibility.
The size and scope of each of the indictments were
daunting. Now that they were to be tried together, the
situation became even more pronounced.
An early estimate of the trial—which was provided at
the status conference of 30 October 2001—predicted
that, if the three indictments were to be tried together,
the Prosecution case would require approximately
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T.53). Taking into account the time the Defence would
need to present its case, the total time for the trial was
estimated to take at least 3 years (Prosecutor v. Miloše-
vić 30 October 2001, T.53). The Prosecution clarified in
the motion hearing of 11 December 2001 that the esti-
mated length of the trials, if separate, were in the range
of 13 months for Bosnia, 10 months for Croatia, and
9 months for Kosovo (Prosecutor v. Milošević 11
December 2001, T.99). Although the Prosecution
averred that the joint trial would mean an overall savings
of time (Prosecutor v. Milošević 11 December 2001,
T.99), the scope of the evidence it would seek to adduce
was massive.
The number of witnesses anticipated for all three in-
dictments was estimated early on to be approximately
600 (Motion Hearing 11 December 2001, T.89). It was
clarified later by the Prosecution during a hearing on 11
December 2001 that the number of witnesses for all
three indictments would be 300 (Motion Hearing 11
December 2001, T.97).
The trial: no plain sailing
The prosecution’s case-in-chief
Notwithstanding the scope and size of the case, the pre-
trial phase, which lasted only 7 months, was relatively
brief, and the trial commenced on 12 February 2002
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 4 February 2002).
Length of Prosecution case
On 10 April 2002, the Trial Chamber issued, proprio
motu, an oral decision directing the Prosecution to con-
clude its case, subject to “the unexpected” events such
as illness or other unforeseen circumstances, within
12 months. This was in addition to the 2 months it had
already used. The Trial Chamber expressed the view that
the Prosecution case should not continue for more than
14 months in total (Hearing 10 April 2002, T. 2784 et
seq). Six days later, the Prosecution requested leave to
file an interlocutory appeal of this order pursuant to
Rule 73(D).24 It argued that the Trial Chamber had in-
vaded the independence of the Prosecutor provided for
in Article 16(2) of the Statute (Prosecutor v. Milošević
16 April 2002a).25
On 25 April 2002, the Appeals Chamber issued its de-
cision. It held that, even if Rule 73(D) had been applic-
able in this case, the Chamber was not satisfied that the
conditions for its application had been met (Prosecutor
v. Milošević 25 April 2002a). On 16 May 2002, the
Appeals Chamber issued its legal reasons. It held that
every court possesses the inherent power to control the
proceedings during the course of the trial and that the
Trial Chamber, in limiting the time that the prosecution
had to present its case, had not interfered with theindependence of the Prosecution (Prosecutor v. Miloše-
vić 16 May 2002).26
Evidentiary matters
The sheer scale of the case led to experiments in pro-
cedural mechanisms that would allow the trial to be
completed within reasonable parameters. Most of these
innovations related to reducing the amount of time in
court that was required for the admission of evidence.
Admission of evidence under Rule 92 bis Rule 92 bis
had been adopted in 2000 by the judges of the Tribunal
in order to provide a vehicle for the admission of evi-
dence in lieu of oral testimony, when certain conditions
were met.27 Whether this rule was to be applied in the
Milošević trial was a matter that was litigated by the par-
ties early on in the Kosovo phase of the case.
After having heard the parties, the Trial Chamber decided
to admit the written evidence of many witnesses relevant to
the Kosovo case. In doing so, the Trial Chamber stated,
The Kosovo Indictment expressly states that the
Prosecution does not intend to suggest that the
accused committed any of the crimes charged
personally in a physical sense. The phrase “acts and
conduct of the accused” in Rule 92bis is a plain
expression and should be given its ordinary meaning:
deeds and behaviour of the accused. It should not be
extended by fanciful interpretation. No mention is
made of acts and conduct by alleged co-perpetrators,
subordinates or, indeed, of anybody else. Had the rule
been intended to extend to acts and conduct of
alleged co-perpetrators or subordinates it would
have said so. The fact that conduct is that of
co-perpetrators or subordinates is relevant to whether
cross-examination should be allowed and not to
whether a statement should be admitted. Consequently,
having examined the 23 written statements, the Trial
Chamber finds that the statements go to proof of mat-
ters other than the acts and conduct of the accused
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 21 March 2002, para. 22).
The holding of the Trial Chamber set the standard in
ICTY jurisprudence for what “acts and conduct” means
under Rule 92 bis. The Trial Chamber then went on to
require cross-examination of the witnesses because
[a]nalysis of the statements reveals that all relate to
alleged attacks by Serb forces on Kosovo
municipalities and the resulting deportations and
killings. The accused has put this evidence into issue
and vigorously put forward a contrary case. There is,
therefore, an important issue for the Trial Chamber to
try. The evidence relates to a “critical element of the
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important issue between the parties, as opposed to a
peripheral or marginally relevant issue (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 21 March 2002, para. 24).
Judge Robinson issued a concurring opinion, express-
ing his view that, once a trial chamber determines that
the evidence goes to a “critical element” of the Prosecu-
tion case, the chamber does not have discretion to admit
the evidence without allowing the accused to cross-
examine the witness (Prosecutor v. Milošević 21 March
2002).28
The Trial Chamber would again take up these issues
when it dealt with a Prosecution motion to admit writ-
ten evidence in lieu of oral testimony in relation to a
crime site in Foča, Bosnia. On 10 January 2003, the
Prosecution requested the admission of transcripts and
accompanying exhibits of evidence given by 11 witnesses
who previously testified in the Krnojelac and Kunarac
cases in lieu of viva voce evidence. The Prosecution also
sought an order that the transcripts be admitted without
cross-examination, as Rule 92 bis permitted under para-
graph (E). The Prosecution submitted that the evidence
dealt exclusively with crime-base events alleged to have
occurred in the Foča municipality and not with the acts
and conduct of the accused or a critical element of the
case. On 28 April 2003, the Trial Chamber heard oral ar-
guments on the motion and on 8 May 2003 rendered an
oral ruling. On 30 June 2003, the Trial Chamber issued
its written decision on the motion, holding that the right
of an accused to examine, or have examined, witnesses
against him is not an absolute one (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 30 June 2003, para. 24).
The Trial Chamber decided to admit several of the tran-
scripts without requiring the witnesses to appear for
cross-examination. It did so because the evidence was
purely “crime base” evidence relating to the takeover of a
municipality and, as such, did not involve such a critical
element or important issue as to require further cross-
examination. In so far as it related to an issue between the
parties, it was not of such a nature that it could not be ad-
equately covered by cross-examination in the earlier pro-
ceedings. The Trial Chamber also found that the cross-
examinations in the earlier proceedings were undertaken
on behalf of an accused with a substantially common
interest to serve as Milošević, namely to oppose and con-
test the evidence about the takeover of Foča and to ques-
tion the credibility of the witnesses. Finally, the Trial
Chamber accepted the Prosecution submission that the
cross-examination in the previous cases was adequate, al-
though observing that “quantity is not a measure of the
quality of cross-examination” and that “the measurement
of adequacy cannot be calculated to a nicety” (Prosecutor
v. Milošević 30 June 2003, paras. 39–42).In respect of the some of the witnesses, the Trial
Chamber also noted that it would be unreasonable to in-
sist upon their return to the Tribunal to give evidence
again. Several of the witnesses were the victims of mul-
tiple rapes, and further cross-examination would run the
risk of re-traumatisation. The Chamber held,
Cross-examination should not be permitted
mechanically and as a matter of course. Where the
rights of the accused are protected, as in this case,
by earlier cross-examinations, the balance, as here,
should be struck on the side of the victims and
witnesses (Prosecutor v. Milošević 30 June 2003,
paras. 46–48).
The Chamber made it clear that, in circumstances where
issues arise later in the trial that called into question as-
pects of the testimony given in prior proceedings, the wit-
ness could be called and subjected to cross-examination
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 30 June 2003, para. 49).
Judge Robinson did not agree with the majority’s deci-
sion to admit the transcripts without giving Milošević
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. He
expressed his position in a lengthy dissenting opinion.
According to Judge Robinson,
[t]he faculty for a Trial Chamber to determine that
cross-examination in a previous trial is adequate such
that cross-examination in an ongoing case may be
dispensed with is, in my view, unduly intrusive in
relation to the right of an accused person to determine
his own defence in a system that, despite innovative
procedures drawn from the civil law inquisitorial
system, remains essentially adversarial. The intrusive-
ness of this role may upset the balance between the two
legal systems on which the Tribunal’s sui generis legal
system is built (Prosecutor v. Milošević 30 June 2003,
para. 40).
Judge Robinson ultimately concluded that, in all the
circumstances, a decision to admit the transcripts with-
out requiring the witnesses to appear for cross-
examination resulted in a procedure that achieved expe-
ditiousness at the expense of fairness and thus was in
breach of Articles 20 and 21 of the Statute (Prosecutor
v. Milošević 30 June 2003, para. 44(vi)).
Admission of evidence under Rule 89(F) In addition
to the time-saving procedural mechanisms of Rule 92
bis, the Prosecution responded to the time constraints
placed upon it by attempting to find innovative proced-
ural methods of introducing evidence that would utilise
the least time possible during court hearings. The new
modalities in fact enabled the Prosecution to introduce
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it viva voce from witnesses on the stand. Although the
Trial Chamber disagreed with some of the appropriate-
ness of these methods, it granted certification of inter-
locutory appeals in order to ensure that the Appeals
Chamber set right any errors it had made. This is, in
fact, what happened in respect of the Prosecution’s at-
tempts to utilise Rule 89(F) in such a manner.
Rule 89(F) provided that, “[a] Chamber may receive
the evidence of a witness orally or, where the interests of
justice allow, in written form.” The provision had been
amended in December 2000 in order to modify the
principle of orality that had been there before. At the
same time as this amendment, the Judges adopted Rule
92 bis in order to deal with the admission of a special
kind of hearsay evidence, witness statements and tran-
scripts from previous trials that did not go to the acts
and conduct of the accused. However, there were strict
attestation requirements connected to the admission of
such evidence, with which the Prosecution wished to
dispense. The Prosecution argued that statements of a
witness, made at any time and not in accordance with
the attestation requirements, were nevertheless subject
to admission under Rule 89(F), provided that the witness
was available to attest on the stand that the statement
was in fact his and was available for cross-examination.
In April 2003, the Trial Chamber denied a Prosecution
motion to submit the evidence-in-chief of some of its wit-
nesses in writing, without the need to fulfil the attestation
requirements of Rule 92 bis (Prosecutor v. Milošević 16
April 2003). The Trial Chamber held in its written de-
cision that “under the present Rules, such written
statements are only admissible under Rule 92 bis and
by no other means” (Prosecutor v. Milošević 16 April
2003, p. 2).29 In May 2003, the Trial Chamber certified
an interlocutory appeal of its decision (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 6 May 2003a). In September 2003, the
Appeals Chamber issued its decision on the matter. It
held that, where the witness was present before the
Trial Chamber and orally attested to the accuracy of
his or her statement, the evidence entered into the
record could not be considered to be exclusively “writ-
ten” within the meaning of Rule 92 bis. The Appeals
Chamber explained that the testimony of a witness
constituted a mixture of oral and written evidence and
that the appearance of the witness in court to attest to
a written statement was a crucial factor that rendered
Rule 92 bis inapplicable. According to the Appeals
Chamber, the fact that there should be greater safe-
guards when the evidence relates to the acts and con-
duct of the accused was a factor that a Trial Chamber
could take into account in determining whether to
admit written evidence under Rule 89(F) or what
weight to attach to the evidence. Nonetheless, “theappearance of the witness in court to orally attest to
the accuracy of the tendered statement is an important
safeguard in itself because the witness is certifying the
accuracy of the statement before the Court and is
available to answer questions from the bench” (Pros-
ecutor v. Milošević 20 September 2003, paras. 16, 19).
The Appeals Chamber thus allowed the appeal be-
cause, as a matter of law, the Rules allowed for the ad-
mission of a written witness statement under Rule 89(F)
when the witness was present in court, was available for
cross-examination and any questioning by the judges,
and attested that the statement accurately reflected his
or her declaration and what he or she would say if ex-
amined. The Appeals Chamber returned the matter to
the Trial Chamber for action in accordance with its deci-
sion. The Trial Chamber subsequently admitted witness
statements under Rule 89(F) so long as the information
therein did not go to Milošević’s acts and conduct.30
The jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber in this
interlocutory decision was later codified in a newly
adopted Rule—Rule 92 ter. This Rule quickly beca-
me—and remains to this day—the standard manner in
which the majority of witnesses’ evidence was admitted
in the Tribunal’s cases, thereby reducing the time needed
to lead evidence from witnesses on the stand. It is now
rare for the Tribunal to hear from “pure” viva voce wit-
nesses, and even witnesses who appear in court to give
evidence usually have prior statements or transcripts ad-
mitted into evidence along with their in-court testimony,
a phenomenon that has come to be known as “hybrid
witnesses”.
Rule 92 ter has also been adopted verbatim by the
Judges of the International Residual Mechanism for
Criminal Tribunals, the successor of the ICTY and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), as
Rule 111 (MICT/1 2012). This procedural innovation
will therefore be available for any trials conducted by the
Mechanism of ICTR fugitives, persons accused of con-
tempt before the Mechanism, and any re-trials ordered
by the Appeals Chamber.
Admissibility of investigator’s summary evidence The
Prosecution also attempted to admit evidence in the
form of a summary by an investigator. On 30 May 2002,
the Trial Chamber rejected the admission into evidence
of a summary of witness statements and other material
related to events alleged to have taken place in Račak,
which had been prepared by an investigator of the
Prosecution (Hearing 30 May 2002, T.5940–5944). In so
deciding, the Chamber first referred to an earlier deci-
sion it had rendered in relation to evidence that the
Prosecution had proposed to be given by one of its in-
vestigators who, after reading a series of witness state-
ments, had come to various conclusions. The Chamber
Abtahi and Dawson Journal of International Humanitarian Action  (2016) 1:4 Page 12 of 35had excluded the evidence on the ground that “it was
hearsay evidence of no probative value, which amounted
to no more than a repetition of the Prosecution case”
(Hearing 30 May 2002, T.5941, referring to Hearing,
T.672–673).
With this prior ruling in mind, the Chamber held:
A further reason may be given for excluding this type
of evidence, at least in relation to the conclusions of
the witnesses. That is that for a witness to give his or
her conclusions upon the evidence is to trespass on
the function of the Trial Chamber. It is for the Trial
Chamber to decide which evidence to accept and
which to reject and what conclusions to draw from
the evidence. Therefore, any evidence which
trespasses on those functions is normally to be
excluded (Hearing 30 May 2002, T.5941–5942).
The Prosecution appealed the decision of the Trial
Chamber, and the Appeals Chamber dismissed the ap-
peal (Prosecutor v. Milošević 30 September 2002).
Adjudicated facts In another attempt to admit evidence
in the case using the least amount of time in court, the
Prosecution tested the limits of a trial chamber’s ability
to take judicial notice of adjudicated facts pursuant to
Rule 94. Paragraph (B) of this Rule provided that, “[a]t
the request of a party or proprio motu, a Trial Chamber,
after hearing the parties, may decide to take judicial no-
tice of adjudicated facts or documentary evidence from
other proceedings of the Tribunal relating to matters at
issue in the current proceedings.”
On 25 April 2002, the Prosecution filed a motion, pur-
suant to Rule 94(B), requesting that the Trial Chamber
take judicial notice of facts related to events that oc-
curred in the municipality of Brčko (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 25 April 2002b).31 On 5 June 2002, the Trial
Chamber issued its decision, holding that for a fact to be
capable of admission under Rule 94(B), it should be truly
adjudicated and not based on an agreement between
parties to previous proceedings, such as agreed facts
underpinning a plea agreement (Prosecutor v. Milošević
5 June 2002). Several months later, the Prosecution re-
quested that the Trial Chamber take judicial notice of
facts derived from four cases that had been the subject
of a final judgement on appeal: Prosecutor v. Tadić, Pros-
ecutor v. Delalić et al., Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., and
Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al.32 In April 2003, the Trial
Chamber rendered its decision, in which it admitted
some of the facts in question while rejecting others on
the basis that they could have been the subject of “rea-
sonable dispute” (Prosecutor v. Milošević 10 April 2003).
Later in that month, the Trial Chamber granted the
Prosecution’s request for certification of an interlocutoryappeal of that decision. In October 2003, the Appeals
Chamber “returned the matter to the Trial Chamber for
it to review the taking of judicial notice of the adjudi-
cated facts” (Prosecutor v. Milošević 28 October 2003).
On 6 November 2003, the Trial Chamber asked the
parties and Amici Curiae to make submissions on the ef-
fect of the Appeals Chamber ruling (Prosecutor v. Milo-
šević 6 November 2003). The Amici Curiae submitted
that the Prosecution should be put to the task of
persuading the Trial Chamber that a revised and less ex-
tensive list of facts could be admitted without comprom-
ising the right of Milošević to a fair trial (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 18 November 2003). The Prosecution adhered
to its initial application (Prosecutor v. Milošević 26 No-
vember 2003).
In December 2003, the Trial Chamber issued another
decision on this matter. It held that the admission of ad-
judicated facts on a wholesale basis would raise the pos-
sibility of placing a heavy burden upon Milošević in the
preparation and conduct of his case. The Trial Chamber
was also concerned that attempts by Milošević to rebut
these facts could absorb considerable time and resources
during the course of the proceedings, thereby undermin-
ing judicial economy and expeditiousness (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 16 December 2003a). The Trial Chamber ad-
mitted some of the facts set out by the Prosecution, re-
lating to Foča and Prijedor, and decided that they could
be challenged by Milošević.
Admission of intercepted communications In Septem-
ber 2002, during the course of a witness’s testimony, the
Prosecution indicated that it wished to admit an inter-
cepted conversation as evidence. Milošević objected, ar-
guing that the conversation was obtained illegally and
that “anything that is illegal can be introduced” (Hearing
27 September 2002, T.10389). Later, the Trial Chamber
heard oral submissions from Milošević. He did not con-
test that all the recordings were made on the territory of
Bosnia and was not challenging the authenticity of the
recordings at this stage but argued that all recordings
were intercepted illegally without the authority of the
state agency in-charge (Hearing 30 September 2002,
T.10412). In October, the Prosecution filed its response,
requesting that the Trial Chamber admit into evidence a
number of intercepted communications concerning the
Bosnia phase of the trial (Prosecutor v. Milošević 31
October 2002). On 19 November and 10 December
2002, the Trial Chamber held further hearings.
Thereafter, a number of intercepted communications
were led through different witnesses, including a witness
who was called to verify the procedure and authenticate
all the intercepts. In all, 245 intercepts were marked for
identification, pending admission into evidence. The
Trial Chamber then turned to the task of deciding the
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December 2003, the Trial Chamber admitted the 245 in-
tercepts into evidence on a prima facie basis and re-
served its final ruling with respect to admissibility
subject to a determination of the relevance and reliability
of the intercepts (Prosecutor v. Milošević 16 December
2003b). Upon the Trial Chamber’s request, the Prosecu-
tion submitted on 19 January 2004 its analysis (with re-
spect to relevance and reliability), and the Amici Curiae
on 16 February 2004 identified 15 intercepts to be
assessed for their authenticity by a court-appointed ex-
pert. The court-appointed expert found that the inter-
cepts were substantially complete and that there was
no evidence that they had been tampered with. In June
2004, the Trial Chamber issued its decision, holding
that some of the intercepts were relevant and some
were not and admitting the ones that were (Prosecutor
v. Milošević 14 June 2004, p. 3).
Rule 70: conditions placed upon evidence by states
Rule 70(B) provides that, if the Prosecution is in posses-
sion of information that has been provided to the Pros-
ecutor on a confidential basis and used solely for the
purpose of generating new evidence, that initial informa-
tion and its origin shall not be disclosed by the Prosecu-
tion without the consent of the person or entity
providing the initial information and shall in any event
not be given in evidence without prior disclosure to the
accused.33 Paragraph (C) of Rule 70 provides that, if,
after obtaining the consent of the person or entity pro-
viding information, the Prosecution elects to present as
evidence any testimony, document, or other material so
provided, the trial chamber may not order either party
to produce additional evidence received from the person
or entity providing the initial information. Moreover, a
trial chamber is precluded by paragraph (C) from order-
ing the attendance of witnesses or requiring the produc-
tion of documents in order to compel the production of
such additional evidence. Paragraph (D) provides that, if
the Prosecutor calls a witness to introduce in evidence
any information provided under Rule 70, the trial cham-
ber may not compel that witness to answer any question
relating to the information or its origin, if the witness
declines to answer on grounds of confidentiality.
In practice, the application of this provision of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence was somewhat obscure,
until it was clarified by the Appeals Chamber during the
Milošević case.
In May 2002, the Prosecution requested the Trial
Chamber to order, pursuant to Rule 70, that (i) a repre-
sentative of a government furnishing confidential infor-
mation be present in court during the evidence of a
particular witness, (ii) the Prosecution’s questioning be
limited to a detailed outline agreed to by thegovernment, and (iii) the scope of cross-examination be
limited to the scope of direct examination (Hearing 30
May 2002, T.5953). In its submission before the Trial
Chamber, the Prosecution asked for the witness to be
heard in accordance with paragraphs (C) and (D) of Rule
70 and that two representatives of the relevant govern-
ment be in court during the testimony of the witness, to
deal with matters of national security that might arise.
On 25 July 2002, the Trial Chamber held that, in
order for paragraphs (C) and (D) of Rule 70 to apply,
the evidence of the witness had to satisfy certain cri-
teria set down in paragraph (B) of the Rule. If the
Chamber was not satisfied that these criteria were met,
then Rule 70 did not therefore apply to the evidence of
the witness. However, recognising the right of states to
protect their national security interests, the Chamber
ordered protective measures designed to match those
sought by the Prosecution on behalf of the government.
Specifically, the Prosecutor was ordered to tailor its
examination-in-chief to exclude confidential informa-
tion, cross-examination was not to be permitted be-
yond the subject matter of evidence-in-chief, questions
as to credibility were permitted only if answers were
not liable to reveal confidential information, and the
two government representatives were permitted to be
present (Prosecutor v. Milošević 25 July 2002; see also
23 October 2002, paras. 10–11).
Both the Prosecution and the relevant government
appealed this decision. On 23 October 2002, the Appeals
Chamber issued its decision and held that the determin-
ation of “whether information has been provided in
accordance Rule 70(B) and so benefits from the protec-
tions afforded by that Rule” is limited to an assessment
of “whether the information was in fact provided on a
confidential basis” (Prosecutor v. Milošević 25 July
2002; 23 October 2002, para. 29). Once ascertained that
the prospective testimony of a state official was “in fact
provided on a confidential basis”, the state then enjoyed
the full protection of Rule 70, and the testimony may
not be introduced into evidence without the state’s
consent. The Appeals Chamber therefore interpreted
the provisions of Rule 70 to mean that a state is in full
control of information it provides to a party before the
Tribunal (Prosecutor v. Milošević 23 October 2003a,
paras. 25–29).
In addressing the possibility that states might withhold
relevant information from an accused, the Appeals
Chamber observed that there were two safeguards to
ensure an accused’s right to a fair trial in this context.
First, it held that a trial chamber does have limited au-
thority to police the application of the rule, by determin-
ing whether the information was “in fact provided on a
confidential basis”; if in doubt, the chamber should hear
the information provider and the prosecution on the
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paras. 26, 29, 31). Yet this enquiry is of “a very lim-
ited nature” (Prosecutor v. Milošević 23 October
2003a, para. 29) and does not include any scrutiny as
to the basis for the confidentiality, unlike compelled
state documents under Rule 54 bis (F)(i), which will
be discussed below. Second, the Appeals Chamber
found that Rule 70(G), which empowers a chamber to
“exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial”, gives a
chamber “a tool to protect [the fair trial] requirement
if the Rule has been misused” (Prosecutor v. Milošević 23
October 2003a, para. 26).
The ruling of the Appeals Chamber therefore clarified
the meaning and application of Rule 70, thereby provid-
ing more certainty to parties and states dealing with the
provision of information in relation to the cases before
the Tribunal.
Rule 54 bis: litigation between the Prosecution and
Serbia and Montenegro over the production of
documents Throughout the trial, there was vigorously
contested litigation between the Prosecution and the
government of Serbia and Montenegro, formerly the
FRY, over the production of documents relevant to the
core proceedings.34 This litigation pursuant to Rule 54
bis took place from almost the very beginning of the trial
and was still being pursued at the time of Milošević’s
death and the subsequent close of the proceedings
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 14 March 2006).
When the Security Council adopted Resolution 827 on
23 May 1993, it exercised its powers under Chapter VII
of the UN Charter, in the form of Article 29 of the Stat-
ute, to obligate states to cooperate with the ICTY in its
investigations and prosecutions. Moreover, states were
enjoined to “comply without undue delay with any re-
quest for assistance or an order issued by a Trial Cham-
ber, including, but not limited to … the taking of
testimony and the production of evidence…” (Statute of
ICTY, Art. 29; see UNSC Res 827 1993; UNSC Res 955
1994). The UN Secretary-General, in his report accom-
panying the Statute, stated in relation to Article 29 that
the establishment of the ICTY pursuant to Chapter VII
“creates a binding obligation on all States to take what-
ever steps are required to implement” a decision of the
Tribunal (UNSC 1993, para. 125).35
The ICTY’s power to order the production of docu-
ments from a State was confirmed by the ICTY Appeals
Chamber in Prosecutor v. Blaškić (Prosecutor v. Blaškić
29 October 1997, para. 26) and was later codified in Rule
54 bis.36 A state’s failure to comply with an order of a
chamber could be reported to the ICTY President, who
then must transmit this report to the UN Security Coun-
cil pursuant to Rule 7 bis.In preparation for the trial, and as early as December
2001, the Prosecution had issued requests for assistance
to the FRY, in the form of requests for documents and
access to identified archives (Prosecutor v. Milošević 13
December 2002, paras. 1–4). After over a year of alleged
partial non-compliance with these requests by the FRY,
and 10 months after the trial began, the Prosecution re-
quested, in December 2002, the Trial Chamber to order
the FRY to produce certain documents and grant the
Prosecution access to 16 archives in the control of the
FRY (Prosecutor v. Milošević 13 December 2002, paras.
1–5).37 The Prosecution emphasised that the FRY’s fail-
ure to provide documents had “seriously obstructed
the progress of this trial” because the use of the re-
quested documents “may very substantially abbreviate
the trial proceedings—as in the eight-month Nurem-
berg trial … [which] focused on documentary evi-
dence” (Prosecutor v. Milošević 13 December 2002,
para. 4, note 2). The Prosecution also argued that the
unavailability of the requested documents prejudiced
the rights of victims, as well as Milošević’s right to a
fair trial (Prosecutor v. Milošević 13 December 2002,
para. 7).
Serbia and Montenegro opposed the application in a
written submission and informed the Chamber that it
welcomed the opportunity to examine its cooperation
with the ICTY, for example, Serbia and Montenegro’s in-
dictment and arrest of Milošević in 2001, as well as his
transfer to the ICTY in June 2001 (see Prosecutor v.
Milošević 7 February 2003, paras. 2–3). Moreover, Serbia
and Montenegro argued that it could not be considered
in non-compliance with requests for assistance pursuant
to Article 29 of the Statute because the production of
documentation was “a process”, it had completed 58 %
of the Prosecution requests, and the situation had to be
viewed in the context of the “new democratic authorities
inherit[ing] a tremendous task of reforming an adminis-
tration shaped during 12 years of Milošević’s rule” (see
Prosecutor v. Milošević 7 February 2003, para. 4). After
arguing that many of the requests that the Prosecution
characterised as unfulfilled had in fact been fulfilled,
Serbia and Montenegro rejected the proposition that
anything in the Statute or Rules provided a legal basis
upon which a chamber could grant a party access to
state archives (see Prosecutor v. Milošević 7 February
2003, paras. 5–6, 8–17). Serbia and Montenegro further-
more argued that Article 18(2) of the Statute and Rule
39 did not authorise such an order by a chamber (see
Prosecutor v. Milošević 7 February 2003, para. 14;
Statute of ICTY; IT/32/Rev.44 10 December 2009).38 It
was finally argued by Serbia and Montenegro that the
Prosecution’s application failed to meet the requirements
of Rule 54 bis (A) (Prosecutor v. Milošević 7 February
2003, paras. 18–32).39
Abtahi and Dawson Journal of International Humanitarian Action  (2016) 1:4 Page 15 of 35In a reply, the Prosecution sought to clarify that its
request for access to governmental archives was not a
demand for general access but rather a request “to sur-
vey archives in order to establish what documents, if
any, may be pertinent to Tribunal proceedings” (see
Prosecutor v. Milošević 27 February 2003, para. 3, note
8; 14 February 2003; 19 February 2003). Moreover, it
argued that access to archives could be achieved not
only under Rule 54 bis but also via a search warrant is-
sued pursuant to Rules 39 and 54 and noted that such
orders had been issued for official governmental build-
ings, including military facilities and archives in the
former Yugoslavia (see Prosecutor v. Milošević 27
February 2003, paras. 8–16).40
After hearing the Prosecution and Serbia and
Montenegro in March 2003, the Trial Chamber is-
sued an oral order giving Serbia and Montenegro
2 months to respond to a priority list of documents
compiled by the Prosecution (Hearing 10 March
2003, T.17526–17580; see Prosecutor v. Milošević 6
May 2003b, para. 8). In the words of the Prosecution,
“Serbia and Montenegro is acting as if it is an ad-
verse party to litigation rather than a State party
assisting the International Tribunal in its search for
truth and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia”
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 20 May 2003, paras. 1, 3,
21–22, notes 30–31 (citing UNSC Res 827 1993;
UNSC Res 955 1994); Jorda 2002; del Ponte 2002).
Another hearing was held, which resulted in a series
of orders being issued by the Chamber for Serbia
and Montenegro to produce thousands of documents
by a particular deadline or update the Chamber of
the specific reasons why it could not do so (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 3 June 2003, T. 21648–21693). Among these
documents were the stenographic recordings of meet-
ings of the FRY’s Supreme Defence Council (SDC), as
well as documents relating to the Supreme Command
and the Joint Command for Kosovo (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 5 June 2003; 12 June 2003, Annex A, p. 1,
Rulings 1–3).41
What followed was a prolix, labyrinthine effort by
the Prosecution and the Chamber to force Serbia and
Montenegro to comply with the many orders that had
been issued (Prosecutor v. Milošević 15 September
2003, pp. 2–3; 17 December 2003, p. 2). After at least
13 decisions over the course of a year and with the
Prosecution case almost at an end, it would have been
conceivable for the Trial Chamber to bring to an end
these Rule 54 bis proceedings, but instead, the Cham-
ber showed a willingness to continue the litigation
well into its second year, by issuing additional orders
for the production of documents and supplemental
reporting by both the Prosecution and Serbia and
Montenegro.42Self-representation, Part II
Adequate assistance At the start of the trial, the Trial
Chamber turned its attention to ensuring that Milošević
had adequate assistance for his defence. It considered a
brief of the Amici Curiae regarding whether Milošević
had access to adequate facilities to conduct his defence
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 5 March 2002). The Chamber
also considered a Registry Report on the matter (Pros-
ecutor v. Milošević 18 March 2002). During a hearing
on 10 April 2002, Milošević identified two lawyers as as-
sociates with whom he wished to communicate.43 Less
than a week later, the Trial Chamber varied its order of
15 November 2001 and granted Milošević privileged
communications with them (Prosecutor v. Milošević 16
April 2002b). In October 2003, the Trial Chamber, upon
the written request of Milošević, appointed a third law-
yer as a “Legal Associate”.44 On 24 April 2002, the Trial
Chamber found that, in accordance with Article 21 of
the Statute, Milošević had adequate time and facilities
for the preparation of his defence and that it was satis-
fied that “all possible efforts were being made to assist
him” (Hearing 24 April 2002, T.3737–3740).
In October 2002, the Trial Chamber instructed the
Registry to revoke the appointment of one of the Amici
Curiae on grounds of apprehension of bias. That Amicus
had granted interviews to several publications in which
it appeared that he had “formed a view of the case un-
favourable to the Accused”.45 Approximately a month
later, the Trial Chamber designated a new person as
Amicus Curiae with respect to questions of international
law.46
The Trial Chamber’s first decision on assignment of
counsel47 Despite the assistance to Milošević from the
three Amici Curiae and the three Legal Associates, from
about 1 month into the start of the trial, Milošević began
to show signs of ill health. This resulted in hearings
being cancelled at the last minute and delays in the
proceedings. In November 2002, the Trial Chamber
expressed concern about the completion of the trial in
the light of the state of Milošević’s ill health and the
length and complexity of the case and ordered submis-
sions from the parties on the matter.48
A week later, the Prosecution filed a motion, pro-
posing that the Trial Chamber appoint defence
counsel for Milošević with the suggestion that the
Amici Curiae be appointed to the role of defence
counsel (Prosecutor v. Milošević 8 November 2002).
Milošević rejected the suggestion in court a few days
later (Hearing 11 November 2002, T.12837). The
Amici Curiae filed their own submissions on the mat-
ter, indicating that “the interests of justice do not re-
quire the assignment of counsel, which would deprive
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(Prosecutor v. Milošević 18 November 2002, p. 6).
In December, the Trial Chamber orally rejected the
Prosecution’s Motion, stating that “[d]efence counsel will
not be imposed upon the Accused against his wishes in
the present circumstances. It is not normally appropriate
in adversarial proceedings such as these. The Trial
Chamber will keep the position under review” (Hearing
18 December 2002, T.14574). In April 2003, the Trial
Chamber issued its written reasons for this decision
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 4 April 2003, paras. 18–41),
holding that the plain reading of Article 21(4)(d) of the
Statute provided for a right to defend oneself in person,
this interpretation being supported by the essentially ad-
versarial nature of the ICTY proceedings (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 4 April 2003, paras. 18–20). The Chamber
pointed out that the imposition of a defence counsel
upon an accused who does not want one was a feature
of inquisitorial systems, but not of adversarial systems
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 4 April 2003, para. 21). More-
over, remarked the Chamber, in Romano-Germanic legal
systems, where the court was fulfilling a more investiga-
tive role in an attempt to establish the truth, it may have
been appropriate to appoint defence counsel for an ac-
cused who wishes to represent himself. However, the im-
position of defence counsel on an unwilling accused in
an adversarial system would effectively deprive that ac-
cused of putting forward a defence, because in adversar-
ial systems it was the responsibility of the parties to put
forward the case and for the court to judge (Prosecutor
v. Milošević 4 April 2003, para. 24).
The Trial Chamber did observe that “the right to de-
fend oneself in person is not absolute …, as there may
be circumstances where it is in the interests of justice to
appoint counsel” (Prosecutor v. Milošević 4 April 2003,
para. 40). For example, an accused whose behaviour had
resulted in his removal from the courtroom pursuant to
Rule 80(B),49 “has also relinquished his right to defend
himself in person”. The Trial Chamber held that at that
point in the trial no circumstance had arisen that sup-
ported the imposition of defence counsel but stated that
it would “keep the position under review”. The Trial
Chamber also held that, “while ensuring that the trial is
fair and expeditious, a Trial Chamber must also ensure
that the rights of the accused, as set out in Article 21 of
the Statute, are not infringed” (Prosecutor v. Milošević 4
April 2003, paras. 40–41).
In order to lessen the physical burden on Milošević, the
Chamber moved to a schedule of four consecutive rest
days every other week until the end of September 2003
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 22 September 2004, para. 9).
Following repeated delays in the trial and with seven
hearing days having been lost in the month of September
alone, on 23 September, the Prosecution filed a motionrequesting a hearing to discuss the implications of
Milošević’s recurring ill health (Prosecutor v. Milošević
23 September 2003). The Trial Chamber ordered both
the Prosecution and the Amici Curiae to make written
legal submissions in relation to the proposals made by
the Prosecution in its motion and thereafter to make
submissions at an oral hearing on 30 September (Pros-
ecutor v. Milošević 24 September 2003). After consid-
ering the parties’ submissions, the Trial Chamber made
an oral ruling to the effect that the Chamber would sit
3 days per week, giving Milošević 4 days of consecutive
rest each week (Prosecutor v. Milošević 30 September
2003). Milošević was not present at the hearing due to
illness.Interlude
End of the Prosecution case
On 2 September 2003, the Trial Chamber held a status
conference to discuss the anticipated conclusion of the
Prosecution’s case and the preparation for the presenta-
tion of the defence case (Hearing, Pre-Defence Confer-
ence, 02 September 2003, T. 25943-25945). Milošević
was expected to continue to prepare his defence case
during the interval between the end of the Prosecution
case-in-chief and the commencement of the defence
case. However, Milošević took the position that the
amount of time he needed to prepare his defence case
“even the barest minimum of the time … would have to
be in excess of two years” (Hearing 2 September 2003,
T.25944). Milošević also reminded the Chamber that
“the opposite side itself disclosed about half a million
pages” of material (Hearing 2 September 2003, T.25943–
25945).
On 17 September 2003, the Trial Chamber ordered that
the trial would be adjourned for 3 months between the
close of the Prosecution’s case-in-chief and the commence-
ment of the defence case to enable Milošević to prepare his
case (Prosecutor v. Milošević 17 September 2003). In Janu-
ary 2004, the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s
decision (Prosecutor v. Milošević 20 January 2004).
On 25 February 2004, the Prosecution (via a written
filing) rested its case-in-chief, subject to several matters
pertaining to the admission of documents and its case in
rebuttal (Prosecutor v. Milošević 25 February 2004a).
The Trial Chamber, on the same day, issued a decision,
confirming the close of the Prosecution’s case-in-chief
and making several rulings on outstanding motions per-
taining to the admission of documentation (Prosecutor
v. Milošević 25 February 2004b).50 The Trial Chamber
allotted 360 h, or 90 sitting days, to Milošević for the
presentation of his case-in-chief. This was the same
amount of time as the Prosecution was given, despite
Milošević’s persistent claims that he only was given half
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evidence (Prosecutor v. Milošević 25 February 2004c).
Amici Curiae motion for judgement of acquittal51
On 3 March 2004, the Amici Curiae filed a motion
requesting that the Trial Chamber acquit Milošević on a
number of charges in the indictments, pursuant to Rule
98 bis (Prosecutor v. Milošević 3 March 2004, paras.
29–32). This Rule, at the time, provided that “[a]n ac-
cused may file a motion for the entry of judgement of
acquittal on one or more offences charged in the indict-
ment within seven days after the close of the Prosecu-
tor’s case and, in any event, prior to the presentation of
evidence by the defence” and that “[t]he Trial Chamber
shall order the entry of judgement of acquittal on mo-
tion of an accused or proprio motu if it finds that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction on that or
those charges.”
The Amici Curiae argued, on Milošević’s behalf, that
the Prosecution failed to establish the existence of an
“armed conflict” in Kosovo prior to the commencement
of the NATO bombing campaign on 24 March 1999,
thus requiring parts of the Kosovo Indictment
dependent upon this legal precondition to be dismissed
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 3 March 2004, paras. 29–32;
see 3 May 2004, paras. 17–75). They also argued that
the Prosecution had failed to establish that Croatia was a
state before some time between 15 January and 22 May
1992; thus, the conflict in Croatia was not of an inter-
national character before that time and all grave
breaches counts in the Croatia Indictment that went to
alleged crimes committed before these dates should be
dismissed (Prosecutor v. Milošević 3 March 2004, para.
95; see 3 May 2004, paras. 122–153). Next, it was argued
that the Prosecution had not adduced any or sufficient
evidence that Milošević planned, instigated, ordered,
committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the plan-
ning, preparation, or execution of a genocide or that he
was complicit in such acts. Along these lines, the Amici
Curiae submitted that the mens rea requirement for es-
tablishing the crime of genocide was incompatible with
the mens rea requirement for the third category of a
joint criminal enterprise and command responsibility, as
alleged in the Bosnia Indictment (Prosecutor v. Milošević
3 March 2004, paras. 161–162; see 3 May 2004, paras.
225–439). Finally, it was submitted that the Prosecution
had not adduced any or sufficient evidence in relation to
185 separate allegations contained in the three indict-
ments (Prosecutor v. Milošević 3 March 2004, sections
III.E, IV.D, V.C.).52
At this point, the Presiding Judge, Richard May, who
had steered the trial through the pre-trial phase and
through most of the Prosecution’s case-in-chief, resigned
effectively on 1 June 2004, due to ill health, and JudgePatrick Robinson took over as the Presiding Judge of the
trial. Judge Iain Bonomy was appointed in order to make
up the quorum of three judges (Prosecutor v. Milošević
10 June 2004). Judge May, now knighted by the Queen
of England, passed away a short time later (Simons
2004).
In June, the Trial Chamber issued its decision, holding
that the Prosecution had adduced sufficient evidence for
a Trial Chamber to find that there existed an armed con-
flict in Kosovo in the FRY prior to 24 March 1999 (Pros-
ecutor v. Milošević 16 June 2004, para. 318). The Trial
Chamber also found that there was sufficient evidence
that Croatia had become a state by 8 October 1991 for
the purposes of Rule 98 bis and that the conflict in
Croatia was thus international during the time of the
grave breaches counts in the Croatia Indictment (Pros-
ecutor v. Milošević 16 June 2004, para. 115). The motion
of the Amici Curiae was thus dismissed in these
respects.
With respect to the Amici Curiae submissions con-
cerning genocide, the Trial Chamber dismissed the
motion—except for the allegations of genocide in Kotor
Varoš—and held that there was sufficient evidence that
“there existed a joint criminal enterprise, which in-
cluded members of the Bosnian Serb leadership, the
aim and intention of which was to destroy a part of the
Bosnian Muslims as a group, and that its participants
committed genocide in Brčko, Prijedor, Sanski Most,
Srebrenica, Bijeljina, Ključ and Bosanski Novi” (Pros-
ecutor v. Milošević 16 June 2004, para 232(1)). The
Trial Chamber also found that there was sufficient evi-
dence to hold that Milošević was a participant in that
joint criminal enterprise, the aim of which was also to
commit crimes other than genocide and that it was rea-
sonably foreseeable to him that, as a consequence of
the commission of those crimes, genocide of a part of
the Bosnian Muslims as a group would be committed
by participants in the joint criminal enterprise (Pros-
ecutor v. Milošević 16 June 2004, para. 323(2)–(3)). Fi-
nally, the Chamber found that there was sufficient
evidence to hold that Milošević aided and abetted
genocide or was responsible for genocide through the
doctrine of superior responsibility (Prosecutor v. Milo-
šević 16 June 2004, para. 323(4)–(5)).
Presiding Judge Robinson appended a separate opinion,
discussing the legal standard to be applied to a motion for
acquittal (Prosecutor v. Milošević 16 June 2004, section
VI, paras. 1–18). Judge Kwon appended a dissenting opin-
ion, with respect to the Trial Chamber’s holding that the
Prosecution had adduced sufficient evidence for a Trial
Chamber to find that Milošević was responsible for geno-
cide under Article 4 of the Statute under the theory of the
third category of joint criminal enterprise (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 16 June 2004, section VII, paras. 1–4).
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lating to some of the counts in the indictments, the ef-
fect of the Trial Chamber’s determinations was that
there was sufficient evidence to support each count chal-
lenged in the three indictments (Prosecutor v. Milošević
16 June 2004, section VII, paras. 1–4). The trial would
therefore proceed to the defence phase of the proceed-
ings (Prosecutor v. Milošević 16 June 2004, para. 316). It
is interesting to note that this would turn out to be the
only decision of the Trial Chamber evaluating the evi-
dence in the trial, although the standard of proof for this
motion was only whether there was sufficient evidence
upon which a trial chamber could convict, rather than
whether there was evidence beyond reasonable doubt re-
garding Milošević’s responsibility.
Amending the indictments In April 2004, the Trial
Chamber granted the Prosecution leave to amend the
Bosnia Indictment and confirmed that the operative Bosnia
Indictment was the amended Bosnia Indictment, as
amended on 22 November 2002 (Prosecutor v. Milošević
21 April 2004).53
On 20 July 2004, the Trial Chamber granted the Pros-
ecution leave further to amend the amended Croatia In-
dictment (Prosecutor v. Milošević 20 July 2004; see also
11 March 2004). One week later, the Trial Chamber
modified this order and granted the Prosecution further
leave to amend the amended Croatia Indictment. The
Chamber also confirmed that the second amended
Croatia Indictment was the operative indictment for the
Croatia phase of the proceedings.54
In July, the Trial Chamber invited written submissions
with a view of giving further consideration to ways in
which the trial might be concluded in a fair and exped-
itious manner. Specifically, the Trial Chamber wanted to
explore the possibility of severing one or more of the in-
dictments and then finishing one of the trials first, be-
fore then proceeding to complete the other two trials
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 21 July 2004). The Prosecution,
the Amici Curiae, and Milošević all filed submissions on
this matter. They all expressed their opposition to sever-
ing the indictments (Prosecutor v. Milošević 27 July
2004a; 27 July 2004b; Addendum 6 August 2004). It was
probably the only moment in the trial when the parties
agreed on something. The Trial Chamber decided not to
give further consideration to the matter at that time
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 25 August 2004).
Self-representation, part III: taking the case away from
Milošević
On 27 June 2003, the Trial Chamber ordered that one of
the Amici Curiae’s appointments be concluded at the
end of the Prosecution case. The Chamber also decided
that the other two Amici Curiae (or simply one of them)were to be present for the first 4 weeks of the defence
case (Prosecutor v. Milošević 27 June 2003, paras. 3–4(a)).
After this, the Trial Chamber would determine their fu-
ture role, if any, in the trial (Prosecutor v. Milošević 27
June 2003, para. 4(b)).
During the period leading up to the commencement
of the defence phase of the proceedings, a “Pro Se Legal
Liaison Officer” was created in order to facilitate the
interaction between Milošević and his Legal Associates
with various sections of the ICTY, as well as the Pros-
ecution and Chamber. This person had responsibilities
spanning from the management of documentary evi-
dence on behalf of the Defence to coordinating the ap-
pearances of witnesses to be called by Milošević to give
evidence before the Chamber (see, e.g. Prosecutor v.
Milošević 8 July 2005, p. 2).55
Milošević continued to experience ill health during
February 2004 at the end of the Prosecution case and
throughout the time allocated for the preparation of his
defence. By that stage, the trial had been interrupted
during the course of the Prosecution’s case over a dozen
times on account of the ill health of Milošević, causing
the loss of some 66 trial days. The defence case, sched-
uled to start on 8 June, was postponed on five occasions,
again on account of the ill health of Milošević.
The Trial Chamber heard oral submissions from the
parties on 5 July 2004 on this matter. At that hearing,
there was discussion of recent health reports. The Amici
Curiae raised two issues: Milošević’s fitness to present
his defence at this time and his fitness to stand trial at
all (Hearing 5 July 2004, T.32143). While holding that
there was no evidence before the Trial Chamber that
Milošević was not fit to stand trial, the Trial Chamber
considered that there was evidence indicating that the
health of Milošević was such that he might not be fit to
continue to represent himself and that the continuation
of his self-representation could adversely affect the fair
and expeditious conduct of the trial. Such was the con-
cern of the Trial Chamber that it decided to “carry out a
radical review of the trial process and the continuation
of the trial in the light of the health problems of the
Accused, which are clearly chronic and recurrent based
on the most recent report from the doctor” (Hearing 5
July 2004, T.32153–32154).
The Trial Chamber subsequently directed the Registrar
to identify a cardiologist with no prior involvement in the
treatment of Milošević. He would be instructed to examine
Milošević and consider all relevant information pertaining
to his fitness to continue to represent himself and the likely
impact on the trial schedule, should he continue to do so
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 6 July 2004).56 In mid-July, the
Trial Chamber issued an identical request to the doctor
who had been treating Milošević for cardiological problems
for some time (Prosecutor v. Milošević 15 July 2004).
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sions about the role that counsel could take in ensuring
the fair presentation of the defence case, in particular in
the absence of Milošević’s cooperation with counsel or his
refusal to give them instructions (Prosecutor v. Milošević
6 August 2004). In August, written submissions on the
issue of assigning counsel to Milošević were submitted by
the Prosecution and the Amici Curiae (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 26 July 2004b; 19 August 2004; 13 August 2004;
Addendum 6 August 2004). Milošević made no written
submissions. In September, the Prosecution, the Amici
Curiae, and Milošević each addressed the Trial Chamber
in relation to the future conduct of the case. The issue to
be decided was whether Milošević should be assigned
counsel—against his wishes—in order to ensure his right
to a fair trial.
Having heard all the submissions and having consid-
ered all the related filings submitted during the summer
of 2004 (Prosecutor v. Milošević 26 July 2004b; 27 July
2004a; 19 August 2004; 27 July 2004b; 13 August 2004;
Addendum 6 August 2004), the Trial Chamber gave the
following oral ruling on 2 September:
In its reasons for its decision on the Prosecution
motion concerning assignment of Defence counsel
of 4 April 2003, the Trial Chamber, while holding
that the accused had a right to defend himself, also
held in paragraph 40 that the right to defend oneself
in person is not absolute and that it would keep the
position under review …. The health of the accused
has been a major problem in the progress of the
trial. In the Prosecution’s case, the trial was
interrupted over a dozen times on account of the
ill health of the accused, thereby losing some 66
trial days.
The Defence case that was scheduled to start on 8
June was postponed on five occasions, again on
account of the ill health of the accused. The Trial
Chamber requested Dr. van Dijkman, who has been
treating the accused for cardiological problems for
some time, and Professor Tavernier from Belgium,
who was identified by the registrar as a cardiologist
with no prior involvement in the treatment of the
accused, to examine the accused and consider all
relevant information pertaining to his health in the
context that he represents himself, and report to the
Trial Chamber on the fitness of the accused to
continue to represent himself and the likely impact on
the trial schedule should he continue to do so. Both
doctors reported that the accused suffers from severe
essential hypertension and that his condition was such
that a hypertensive emergency, a potentially life-
threatening condition, could develop. They also foundthat one explanation for his medical condition was his
failure to adhere to the proposed therapeutic plan.
Blood tests carried out on the accused confirmed this
conclusion. It is plain from the medical reports that
the accused is not fit enough to defend himself and
that, should he continue to represent himself, there
will be further delays in the progress of the trial.
The issue before the Chamber is whether the right of
an accused set out in Article 21 of the Statute to
defend himself in person is subject to qualification,
and if it is, whether in the circumstances of this case
that right should be qualified by assigning counsel to
represent the accused.
The Chamber is satisfied, on the basis of the
Tribunal’s Statute and the jurisprudence, as well as
the law of many domestic jurisdictions, that the right
of an accused person to represent himself is not
unfettered, and in the circumstances of this case, it is
both competent to assign counsel to the accused and
in the interests of justice to do so. We shall, therefore,
do so.
The fundamental duty of the Trial Chamber is to
ensure that the trial is fair and expeditious. The
concern of the Chamber is that, based on the medical
reports, there is a real danger that this trial might
either last for an unreasonably long time or, worse
yet, might not be concluded, should the accused
continue to represent himself without the assistance
of counsel. On the other hand, the Chamber is
satisfied that, if counsel is assigned to the accused,
measures can be devised to ensure that the trial
continues in a manner that is both fair and
expeditious.
Having decided to assign counsel to the accused, it
will be the duty of the Chamber to ensure that the
role of assigned counsel is so fashioned that the trial
process, while being expeditious, will protect the
fundamental right of the accused to a fair trial
(Hearing 02 September 2004, T.32357–32359; see
Prosecutor v. Milošević 22 September 2004).
Following this oral ruling and in furtherance of its
duty to ensure that the role of Assigned Counsel was so
fashioned that the trial process would protect the funda-
mental right of Milošević to a fair trial, the Chamber is-
sued an order in which it set out, with specificity, the
functions that the Assigned Counsel would undertake
and the role that Milošević would play in his defence.
Assigned Counsel had the duty to determine how to
present the defence case for Milošević, including choos-
ing, preparing, and examining witnesses; making sub-
missions on fact and law; seeking orders from the Trial
Chamber that they considered necessary to enable them
to present the defence case properly; discussing with
Milošević the conduct of the case and endeavouring to
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views, while retaining the right to determine what course
to follow; and acting in Milošević’s best interests. The
Trial Chamber authorised Milošević, with the leave of
the Trial Chamber, to continue to participate actively in
the conduct of his case, including, where appropriate,
examining witnesses after Assigned Counsel had done
so. The Chamber, in its order, reminded Milošević that
he still retained the right, at any time, to make a reason-
able request to the Trial Chamber to consider allowing
him to appoint counsel (Prosecutor v. Milošević 3
September 2004, pp. 2–3).
The Trial Chamber stated that it was satisfied that
Assigned Counsel would make determined efforts to dis-
cuss the presentation of Milošević’s defence with him.
Should Milošević fail to cooperate with counsel, the trial
would nonetheless proceed. The Trial Chamber further
held that, if such failure on the part of Milošević resulted
in material relevant to Milošević’s case not being pre-
sented, then Milošević had to bear responsibility and
could not plead injustice (Prosecutor v. Milošević 22
September 2004, para. 70).
The defence case
Parameters of the defence case
On 25 February 2004, the Trial Chamber ordered that
Milošević would have the same time as the Prosecution
to present his case-in-chief. The Prosecution had spent
approximately 360 h presenting its case-in-chief or ap-
proximately 90 sitting days (Prosecutor v. Milošević 25
February 2004, para. 1). The Trial Chamber then added
two thirds of that time for cross-examination of wit-
nesses called by the defence and administrative matters,
which amounted to approximately 240 h or 60 sitting
days (Prosecutor v. Milošević 25 February 2004, para. 2).
Milošević would therefore have 150 sitting days in which
to present his case, a period that was subject to adjust-
ment depending upon the time taken in cross-
examination and administrative matters (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 25 February 2004, para. 4).
At the pre-defence conference of 17 June 2004, a num-
ber of orders were made concerning the management of
the defence case. Milošević was limited to 150 sitting
days to present his case, regardless of the number of wit-
nesses he had on his list. The Trial Chamber noted that
it did not seek to limit the number of witnesses Miloše-
vić could call but rather encouraged him to make use of
the procedures available under Rules 92 bis and 89(F).
Milošević was ordered to produce a weekly list of wit-
nesses. He was ordered to disclose to the Prosecution
copies of all exhibits on his Rule 65 ter list within 7 days.
Milošević was required to make written filings when or-
dered by the Trial Chamber to do so. He was allowed to
make an opening statement of not more than 4 h, towhich the Prosecution was not allowed to respond.
Milošević was ordered to make a separate written appli-
cation for each witness whom he would seek to sub-
poena. Finally, Milošević was ordered to make a written
application for the production of documents or other in-
formation from states and to comply with all procedural
requirements; oral applications would not be considered
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 17 June 2004, paras. 1, 3, 9–10,
12, 18–19). In complying with all of these tasks, Milošević
had the assistance of Assigned Counsel, his Legal Associ-
ates, and the Pro Se Legal Liaison Officer.
During the pre-defence conference, Milošević in-
formed the Chamber that he anticipated a witness list
that would include 1631 persons (Prosecutor v. Milošević
17 June 2004, T.32125) and that between 1300 and 1400
witnesses had agreed for their names to be disclosed to
the Trial Chamber (Prosecutor v. Milošević 17 June 2004,
T.32084). Milošević was scheduled to commence the pres-
entation of his defence on 5 July 2004 but was unable to
do so due to medical concerns (Hearing 5 July 2004,
T.32135). His opening statement was not presented until
31 August and 1 September 2004 (Hearing 31 August and
1 September 2004, T.32157–32298). After the opening
statement, the Trial Chamber adjourned for 4 weeks to
enable further preparation for the defence case. The trial
resumed on 12 October 2004.
In a May 2005 order, the Trial Chamber made some
modifications to the use of time in the defence case
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 19 May 2005). The time allo-
cated to the Prosecution for cross-examination was re-
vised to 216 h or 54 sitting days, being 60 % of the time
allotted to Milošević. It was furthermore ordered that a
separate record of time spent on administrative matters
be kept but that it should not be counted against the
time allotted to Milošević (Prosecutor v. Milošević 19
May 2005, para. 3). The Trial Chamber clarified that
“administrative matters are those which do not fall into
the category of procedural issues” arising from examin-
ation of witnesses, “including discussion of the admissi-
bility of exhibits and other matters as determined by the
Trial Chamber” (Prosecutor v. Milošević 19 May 2005,
para. 3).
Self-representation, part IV: giving the case back to
Milošević
Assigned Counsel encountered problems almost imme-
diately and complained about the lack of cooperation
from witnesses and from Milošević himself. For example,
Assigned Counsel only managed to call 5 out of a list of
140 witnesses, many of whom refused to give evidence
in protest against the Trial Chamber’s decision to ap-
point counsel to Milošević against his wishes. In October
2004, Assigned Counsel wrote a letter to the Registrar
seeking to be withdrawn from their position as Counsel
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trar deemed that it was more appropriate for the Trial
Chamber to decide the matter (Prosecutor v. Milošević
27 October 2004b). The Trial Chamber rendered its de-
cision in December, holding that Assigned Counsel
were neither entitled to withdraw nor to terminate
their assignment unilaterally (Prosecutor v. Milošević 7
December 2004, para. 26). In accordance with this deci-
sion, the Registrar denied the Assigned Counsel’s re-
quest (Prosecutor v. Milošević 14 December 2004).
The Assigned Counsel then turned to the President of
the ICTY and asked him to review the Registrar’s
decision to refuse their application to withdraw. In a de-
cision of February 2005, the President held that the re-
fusal of an accused to cooperate with his lawyers did not
mean that the Registrar was required to withdraw the
assignment of counsel under Article 19(A) of the ICTY
Code of Conduct (Prosecutor v. Milošević 7 February
2005a, para. 10 citing paras. 53, 54 of Prosecutor v.
Blagojević). In fact, any other holding in the present case
would in effect give Milošević the power to render the
decision that counsel should be assigned meaningless by
simply refusing to cooperate with the Assigned Counsel
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 7 February 2005a, para. 10).
In November 2004, the Appeals Chamber affirmed
the Trial Chamber’s decision to impose Counsel upon
Milošević, but reversed the Trial Chamber’s order on
the modalities by which that representation would
function. The Appeals Chamber held that the Trial
Chamber should craft a working regime that minimised
the practical impact of the formal assignment of
counsel. Such a regime had to be rooted in the default
presumption that Milošević should take the lead in pre-
senting his case whenever he was able to do so, such as
choosing which witnesses to present, questioning the
witness before Assigned Counsel is given the opportun-
ity to do so, arguing any proper motion he wished, giv-
ing a closing statement, and making the basic strategic
decisions about the presentation of his case. The Appeals
Chamber stressed that Assigned Counsel should only step
in where Milošević’s health prevented him from pre-
senting his own defence (Prosecutor v. Milošević 22
September 2004, paras. 19–20).
The Assigned Counsel were thus effectively returned,
by the Appeals Chamber, to the previous role they had
occupied while they were Amici Curiae, which was, in
essence, stand-by counsel. Milošević was back in control
of his case.
Evidentiary matters
Admission of documents: setting the ground rules A
February 2005 order set forth the Trial Chamber’s gen-
eral approach to the admission of defence evidenceduring Milošević’s case-in-chief (Prosecutor v. Milošević
7 February 2005b). In this order, the Trial Chamber
sought to lay out general ground rules for the copious
amounts of evidence that Milošević said he would tender
during his case, much of which had not yet been trans-
lated into a working language of the Tribunal (Prosecu-
tor v. Milošević 7 February 2005b).
During the defence case, the Prosecution attempted to
adduce evidence to prove its case against Milošević dur-
ing its cross-examination of Milošević’s own witnesses.
The matter was litigated (Prosecutor v. Milošević 15
March 2005) and resulted in a ruling by the Trial Cham-
ber that, although the Prosecution could put material to
a witness during cross-examination in accordance with
Rule 90(H) (Prosecutor v. Milošević 17 May 2005),57 it
was not allowed to have the material admitted when a
defence witness could offer no meaningful evidence in
relation to the tendered material (Prosecutor v. Miloše-
vić 17 May 2005, para. 9). This ruling precluded the
Prosecution from admitting a large body of material
through Milošević’s witnesses during the defence case.
Application to subpoena Tony Blair and Gerhard
Schröder In August 2005, Assigned Counsel filed appli-
cations requesting that a binding order be issued to the
government of the United Kingdom and the Federal Re-
public of Germany. Assigned Counsel wanted the UK
and Germany to arrange for pre-testimony interviews
and the appearance in court of UK Prime Minister Tony
Blair and former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder.
In its decision, the Trial Chamber first clarified that
the subpoena of a state official was appropriately
brought under Rule 54, rather than the provisions of
Rule 54 bis, which were devoted to the compulsion of
documentary evidence from a state. The Trial Chamber
then articulated the legal standard for the issuance of a
subpoena ad testificandum as such: the moving party
must show that a subpoena is “necessary … for the prep-
aration or conduct of the trial”, and this includes a two-
pronged test: a reasonable basis must be shown that the
prospective witness is likely to give information that will
materially assist the applicant with respect to specific is-
sues in the trial (“legitimate forensic purpose” require-
ment), and this information cannot be obtainable
through other means (“last resort” requirement). The
Trial Chamber further clarified that “an applicant for a
subpoena must be specific about the information sought
from the prospective witness and must demonstrate a
nexus between this information and the case against the
accused”. The Trial Chamber, after having examined in
detail the issues in relation to which the Assigned
Counsel wished to subpoena Blair and Schröder, decided
that there was no legitimate forensic purpose for the
their testimony nor was it necessary in order to ensure
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Milošević 9 December 2005).
Having found that the application failed on its merits,
the Trial Chamber did not need to decide whether the
status of the prospective witnesses as senior state offi-
cials gave them immunity from being compelled to at-
tend an interview or testify before the Tribunal
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 9 December 2005, para. 67).Resurfacing of the Rule 54 bis litigation Many of the
documents adduced by the Defence during the direct
examination of witnesses led the Prosecution to request
the Chamber to take further action in relation to prior
Rule 54 bis applications. In August 2005, almost a year
after the start of the defence case, the Prosecution ar-
gued in a renewed Rule 54 bis motion that the testimony
of Božidar Delić revealed that the Defence had been pro-
vided with extensive access to VJ documents, documents
that had been the subject of prior litigation between the
Prosecution and Serbia and Montenegro (see Prosecutor
v. Milošević 24 August 2005, para. 2).
The Chamber ordered Serbia and Montenegro to file
publicly an explanation for “why it did not previously
produce, and to this date still has not produced, the two
‘Joint Command’ documents tendered by witness
Božidar Delić during his testimony, despite the fact that
[a previous decision had] called for the production of
such documents” (Prosecutor v. Milošević 31 October
2005, para. 4(a)). The Chamber noted that Serbia and
Montenegro was “still bound by [a previous decision]
that Serbia and Montenegro ‘continue its efforts to lo-
cate the requested documentation’ and produce such
documentation to the Prosecution, and that a state must
always perform its legal obligations in good faith”
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 31 October 2005).58Milošević’s motion for an extension of time
In December 2005, the Trial Chamber denied Milošević’s
motion for an extension of time in which to present his
defence case (Prosecutor v. Milošević 13 December
2005a). In so doing, the Chamber held that, as of 30
November 2005, Milošević had used 75.35 % of the time
allotted to him. Despite repeated warnings by the Cham-
ber to use his time to address evidence in relation to all
three indictments against him, Milošević had led almost
entirely Kosovo-related evidence (Prosecutor v. Milošević
12 December 2005, para. 16). Moreover, despite having
been urged by the Chamber on several occasions to
make use of the procedural mechanisms of Rules 89(F)
and 92 bis for the admission of written evidence in lieu
of oral testimony, he insisted on leading all evidence
viva voce in court (Prosecutor v. Milošević 12 December
2005, para. 16).Prosecution’s attempt to re-open its case-in-chief
Earlier on, in July 2005, about a year and a half after
closing its case-in-chief against Milošević, the Prosecu-
tion had sought the re-opening of its case in order to
present six new witnesses and 50 new documents (Pros-
ecutor v. Milošević 18 July 2005). This evidence substan-
tively fell into five categories related, according to the
Prosecution, to key issues in its case as follows: a plan to
ethnically cleanse Bosnia of its Muslim population dat-
ing from at least 1992; the involvement of the VJ in the
war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995; the involvement
of Serbia’s Ministry of Interior in the Bosnian war be-
tween 1992 and 1995, including in the Srebrenica mas-
sacre; VJ personnel files of high-ranking military officials
involved in the wars in Bosnia; and VJ involvement in
the Račak massacre in Kosovo in 1999 (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 13 December 2005b, para. 16).
After articulating the legal standard for re-opening,
the Trial Chamber conducted a detailed analysis of each
of the items of evidence that the Prosecution desired to
tender as evidence (Prosecutor v. Milošević 13 December
2005b, paras. 7–15). This analysis included an examin-
ation of whether the items had been newly obtained
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 13 December 2005b, paras.
20–23) and whether the Prosecution has exercised rea-
sonable diligence in relation to the evidentiary items
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 13 December 2005b, paras.
24–32). After having found that some of the items met
this test, the Chamber then went on to assess whether
it should exercise its discretion to allow the re-opening
of the Prosecution’s case for these items, which entailed
weighing the probative value of the evidence against
the need to ensure a fair trial.
The Chamber considered that the exceptional meas-
ure of re-opening the Prosecution’s case-in-chief—which
was certain to cause delay and which was at a late stage of
a trial (begun three and a half years before the motion was
made)—was warranted only where the probative value of
the proposed evidence was particularly high. Based upon
the extensive evidence already adduced during the
Prosecution’s case-in-chief, the Trial Chamber was of the
view that none of the items for which reasonable diligence
was established had sufficient probative value to warrant
admission as the basis of a re-opened case-in-chief.
Although most of the items had some probative value in
relation to the underlying offences charged in the indict-
ments, none was of significance for the ultimate legal
question of whether Milošević was responsible for the
alleged crimes. The Prosecution’s request to re-open its
case was therefore denied (Prosecutor v. Milošević 13
December 2005b, paras. 37–38).
Judge Kwon issued a separate opinion agreeing with
the majority in the outcome of the decision but disagree-
ing with the majority in the approach to materials in the
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case-in-chief and with its reluctance to adopt a “miscar-
riage of justice standard” to such material. Judge Kwon
also disagreed with the majority’s application of the rea-
sonable diligence standard to certain material (Prosecu-
tor v. Milošević 13 December 2005b: Separate Opinion
of Judge O-Gon Kwon, para. 1).
Epilogue: from The Hague to the former
Yugoslavia
Health
Attempt to be provisionally released
In mid-November 2005, pursuant to an oral order from
the Trial Chamber (Hearing 15 November 2005,
T.46481–46484),59 the Registry received and filed re-
ports of three physicians who had conducted medical
examinations of Milošević in early November.60 Following
an oral request by Milošević for provisional release in
mid-December (Hearing 12 December 2005, T.47258–
4725), Assigned Counsel requested that the Trial Cham-
ber grant Milošević’s request for the purpose of medical
treatment in Moscow (Prosecutor v. Milošević 20
December 2005).61 In January 2006, the Trial Chamber
instructed the Defence to submit any additional material,
including the guarantees from the Russian Federation
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 11 January 2006, p. 3). One week
later, this was done, along with a personal undertaking
from Milošević (Prosecutor v. Milošević 22 December
2005).62
On 23 February 2006, the Trial Chamber denied the
request on the basis that Assigned Counsel had made no
real attempt to demonstrate that Milošević’s medical
needs could not be met in The Netherlands (Prosecutor
v. Milošević 23 February 2006, para. 17). Moreover, the
Trial Chamber held as follows:
In any event, the Chamber notes that the Accused is
currently in the latter stages of a very lengthy trial, in
which he is charged with many serious crimes, and at
the end of which, if convicted, he may face the
possibility of life imprisonment. In these
circumstances, and notwithstanding the guarantees of
the Russian Federation and the personal undertaking
of the Accused, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that
the first prong of the test has been met—that is, that
it is more likely than not that the Accused, if released,
would return for the continuation of his trial
(Prosecutor v. Milošević 23 February 2006, para. 18).
Death
On 11 March 2006, Milošević was found dead in his cell.
As a result, on 14 March 2006, the Trial Chamber offi-
cially terminated the proceedings (Prosecutor v. Milošević
14 March 2006).By order of the ICTY President dated 11 March 2006
and pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of Detention, Judge
Kevin Parker was assigned to conduct a full inquiry into
the circumstances surrounding the death of Milošević
and to report his findings to the President. This was
done on 30 May 2006 (Parker 2006). The report referred
to an autopsy conducted by the Dutch Forensic Institute,
confirming that Milošević died of natural causes from a
heart attack. The autopsy results also indicated that no
poisons had been found in Milošević’s body (Parker
2006, p. 40, paras. 2, 31, 36, 38–39). According to the
report,
[n]othing has been found to support allegations
reported in some sections of the media that Mr.
Milošević had been murdered, in particular by
poisoning. The results of the independent
investigation by the Dutch authorities demonstrate
that such allegations are entirely false. (Parker 2006,
p. 40, para. 3).
This latter finding was most likely related to some
media reports speculating that Milošević had been mur-
dered, in particular by poisoning.
Rule 54 bis: the end of the litigation with Serbia and
Montenegro
In what was to be the last days of the trial, the Prosecu-
tion was still pursuing documents from Serbia and
Montenegro and requesting the Trial Chamber to issue
new orders for the production of these documents. In
February 2006, it was announced in open session that
there was to be a closed session hearing held on motions
made by the Prosecution under Rule 54 bis and on
Serbia and Montenegro’s request for protective measures
(Hearing 2 February 2006, T.47780–47782). In March,
the Trial Chamber issued a decision granting many of
the Prosecution’s requests for relief and ordered Serbia
and Montenegro to produce various documents—or, in
the event of non-production, to provide explanations of
the steps taken to locate the documents (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 12 April 2006, para. 14).
On 15 March 2006, Serbia and Montenegro moved
the Trial Chamber to vacate or suspend indefinitely its
decision of 9 March, arguing that termination of the
proceedings deprived the order of its purpose and ren-
dered it without any legal effect (Prosecutor v. Milošević
12 April 2006, paras. 9–10). The Trial Chamber decided
that its decision was no longer operative from the date
of the termination of the proceedings and noted that the
decision’s “status at that time was that it had not yet
been complied with …. In light of this, it is not necessary
for the Chamber to ‘vacate’ or ‘suspend’ the effect of the
Decision” (Prosecutor v. Milošević 12 April 2006, para.
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gro’s motion to vacate as unnecessary, thus bringing to
an end the litigation over the production of documents
between the Prosecution and Serbia and Montenegro, at
least in the Milošević trial.
However, many of the documents that were produced
pursuant to orders issued by the Trial Chamber in the
Milošević trial ended up being used in other trials, such
as the Perišić and Milutinović et al. trials.
Conclusion
At the time of the termination of the case, Milošević had
about 20 % of the time remaining that he had been given
to present his case (Prosecutor v. Milošević 12 December
2005, para. 16). As mentioned before, on 12 December
2005, the Trial Chamber had denied a motion by
Milošević for more time, due to the fact that he had
squandered the time he had been given, despite multiple
warnings and guidance from the Chamber (Prosecutor v.
Milošević 12 December 2005, paras. 16–26). The defence
case was therefore almost at an end.
One week after the death of Milošević, tens of thou-
sands attended a farewell ceremony in Belgrade. He was
subsequently buried in his home town Pozarevac, in the
absence of his wife and other immediate family mem-
bers, who were not living in the former Yugoslavia. The
national authorities neither allowed him a state funeral
nor did they attend the ceremonies (BBC 2006). Thus
came to an end Milošević’s judicial journey. Having left
Belgrade 5 years earlier for The Hague, he would now
rest back in the former Yugoslavia—neither convicted
nor acquitted. Despite this eternal judicial limbo, it is
important to evaluate the effects of the trial upon inter-
national criminal justice.
The Milošević proceedings illustrated the challenge of
conducting complex criminal proceedings involving alle-
gations of mass crimes, while still endeavouring to en-
sure a fair and expeditious trial. The size and scope of
the indictments and the question of self-representation
constituted a most fragile combination. The efforts of
the Chamber to temporally delimit the length of the
Prosecution case-in-chief—and eventually the defence
case—can be viewed as “classic” examples of the man-
agerial judging system, as opposed to the adversarial or
inquisitorial systems of law (Langer 2005). But when
Milošević’s poor health was added to the mix, the results
were the inability to complete the trial (see Additional
file 2). The Trial Chamber’s two attempts to sever the
Kosovo case from Croatia and Bosnia cases were prob-
ably the best chances, at later stages of the proceedings,
to bring at least one of the cases to a conclusion, but
these overtures were rejected by the Prosecution, Milo-
šević, and the Amici Curiae (Prosecutor v. Milošević 12
December 2005, para. 7).Despite Milošević’s protestations that he had been pro-
vided with inadequate resources in order to lodge his de-
fence, Milošević benefited from a wide range of
assistance outside the courtroom. The extent to which
Milošević’s Legal Associates were involved in the prepar-
ation of his defence was often demonstrated by the de-
tailed knowledge that Milošević had of the witnesses,
which was displayed during his cross-examination of
them. Moreover, throughout the Prosecution case,
Milošević had three Amicus Curiae to assist him with
legal submissions and the cross-examination of wit-
nesses.63 The Chamber had also assigned, during Milo-
šević’s defence case, two lawyers and a defence team to
assist him with the presentation of his case, not to men-
tion the creation of an entirely new office—a Pro Se
Legal Liaison Office—which was staffed by several per-
sons to assist Milošević in preparing and presenting his
defence (Prosecutor v. Milošević 12 December 2005,
para. 21). A perusal of the public orders and decisions
issued by the Chamber reveals that Milošević was in fact
receiving aid from a number of different individuals
throughout the course of the trial. When one is there-
fore talking about Milošević “representing himself”, it is
important to keep in mind the reality of the situation
and the full picture of the assistance that Milošević was
receiving from many different quarters.
In fact, the elaborate arrangements that were put into
place for Milošević’s purported “self-representation” call
into question the meaning of the very term “self-repre-
sentation”. The limits of self-representation have also
been tested in subsequent cases before the Tribunal,
such as the Krajišnik and Karadžić cases (see, e.g.
Prosecutor v. Krajišnik 11 September 2007; Prosecutor
v. Karadžić 7 May 2009). It may be that an accused
opting for “self-representation” is more to be understood
as retaining complete control over the day-to-day man-
agement of his case, rather than as actually doing the
legal work that a lawyer would normally conduct. Being
represented by a lawyer can, in this sense, be viewed as a
delegation of control of the case from the accused to the
lawyer, whereas self-representation keeps the accused in
the driver’s seat. It also, however, places control in the
hands of a person, the accused, who has no professional
duties to the court or to the administration of justice. It
therefore can set the stage for an abuse of the judicial
process.
Although the Milošević trial will forever remain unfin-
ished, the issue of the utilisation of the records of the
proceedings should not be underestimated. According to
Human Rights Watch:
Future generations will use the evidence to
understand the region’s history and how the conflicts
came to pass. Because no truth commission has been
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Milosevic trial may be one of the only venues in
which a great deal of evidence was consolidated about
the conflicts (Human Rights Watch 2006, p. 14).
Over an extended period of time, the Trial Chamber
displayed a willingness to engage with the Prosecution
and Serbia and Montenegro in a series of procedurally
and substantively complex circumstances surrounding a
multitude of documents. And yet, the Chamber did not
stray from its impartial role as an arbiter interposed be-
tween two opponents, balancing the need of the Pros-
ecution for documents to prove its case and Serbia and
Montenegro’s concerns. The Trial Chamber’s approach
resulted in documents being produced to the Pro-
secution by Serbia and Montenegro that otherwise
would not have been produced. Materials produced in
the Milošević case have been used in cases before other
international courts, such as the genocide case brought
by Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serbia and
Montenegro at the International Court of Justice (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro 2007). Fi-
nally, materials obtained in the Milošević trial will be of
interest to historians and political scientists seeking to
gain an understanding of the events that took place dur-
ing the dissolution of the SFRY.
Although Milošević’s trial never came to a conclusion,
another ICTY Trial Chamber in a subsequent case made
findings of fact beyond reasonable doubt regarding
Milošević’s involvement in the Kosovo conflict in 1999.
The case of Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al.—otherwise
known as the “Milošević Generals Trial”—was the ori-
ginal Kosovo case against Milošević and his co-
defendants Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, and
Dragoljub Ojdanić, who were all indicted together for
crimes committed in Kosovo during the NATO bombing
campaign in the summer of 1999. After Milošević was
severed from the multi-accused trial in order to be tried
alone (Prosecutor v. Milošević, Milutinović, Šainović,
Ojdanić, and Stojiljković 5 September 2002), his co-
defendants were tried later, from 2006 to 2009 in their
own trial, along with three other defendants who were
joined to the case. As a result, the Milutinović et al. case
was essentially the Kosovo case without Milošević. As
such, Milošević featured heavily in the trial and through-
out the extensive four-volume Judgement.
In the final findings of the Trial Chamber, it was deter-
mined—beyond reasonable doubt—that Milošević
shared, with the other members of a joint criminal en-
terprise, the intent to forcibly displace part of the
Kosovo Albanian population, both within and outside
Kosovo, and thereby change the ethnic balance in the
province to ensure continued control by the FRY and
Serbian authorities over it (Prosecutor v. Milutinovićet al. 26 February 2009, vol. 3, paras. 466, 781, 1130).
The Trial Chamber also found that there was a clandes-
tine operation to exhume over 700 bodies originally bur-
ied in Kosovo and transfer them to Serbia during the
NATO bombing and that Milošević was involved in
organising this large-scale operation. The purpose of this
operation was to conceal hundreds of bodies from the
international representatives and NATO ground forces,
whose presence on the ground in Kosovo was antici-
pated following the NATO bombing. The Trial Chamber
concluded that Milošević knew that the great majority of
the corpses moved were victims of crimes and were ci-
vilians, including women and children (Prosecutor v.
Milutinović et al. 26 February 2009, vol. 3, para. 87).
But ultimately the most important outcome of the
Milošević trial is that it demonstrated, for the first time
in the post-World War II international criminal justice
setting, the implementation of the concept of account-
ability of heads of state for the commission of the most
serious crimes of concern to humanity. While in the
1990s this was still a questionable endeavour, it has now
become an accepted fact. Today, “being sent to The
Hague” has become an expression used to refer to top-
level military and political leaders being held account-
able for their alleged misdeeds. From the transfer of
Milošević to The Hague to the last day of his trial, the
public—both in the Balkans and the rest of the world—-
could witness day after day the appearance, the actions,
and the reactions of a head of state in an international
criminal court, examining and cross-examining wit-
nesses and interacting with the Prosecution and the
Judges. And this was in the cold light of the courtroom,
rather than through the filters of the media and politics.
Practical and legal lessons must be learned from the
Milošević proceedings.64 But it was the piercing of the
corporate veil surrounding heads of state that constitutes
the ultimate achievement of the Milošević trial. The daily
grind of the courtroom offered the public the unprece-
dented opportunity of scrutinising a head of state’s
conduct in relation to a state’s political and military ap-
paratus. By bringing someone previously “untouchable”
to the courtroom, the ICTY challenged—and ultimately
dispelled—the myth of impunity. It is this iconoclastic
deed that changed international criminal justice irrevers-
ibly. And this was no minor feat.Endnotes
1The first head of state to be convicted by a supra-
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Law Library 2008.
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a Judge or a Trial Chamber under paragraph (B) or (E)
shall be subject to appeal with the leave of a bench of
three Judges of the Appeals Chamber on the same
grounds and conditions as set out in Rule 73(D) and
(E).(D)(i) Except in cases where a decision has been
taken pursuant to paragraph (B) or paragraph (E), the
State concerned shall be given notice of the application,
and not less than fifteen days’ notice of the hearing ofthe application, at which the State shall have an oppor-
tunity to be heard.(ii) Except in cases where the Judge or
Trial Chamber determines otherwise, only the party
making the application and the State concerned shall
have the right to be heard.(E) If, having regard to all cir-
cumstances, the Judge or Trial Chamber has good rea-
sons for so doing, the Judge or Trial Chamber may
make an order to which this Rule applies without giving
the State concerned notice or the opportunity to be
heard under paragraph (D), and the following provisions
shall apply to such an order:(i) the order shall be served
on the State concerned;(ii) subject to paragraph (iv), the
order shall not have effect until fifteen days after such
service;(iii) a State may, within fifteen days of service of
the order, apply by notice to the Judge or Trial Chamber
to have the order set aside, on the grounds that disclos-
ure would prejudice national security interests.Paragraph
(F) shall apply to such a notice as it does to a notice of
objection;(iv) where notice is given under paragraph (iii),
the order shall thereupon be stayed until the decision on
the application;(v) paragraphs (F) and (G) shall apply to
the determination of an application made pursuant to
paragraph (iii) as they do to the determination of an ap-
plication of which notice is given pursuant to paragraph
(D);(vi) the State and the party who applied for the order
shall, subject to any special measures made pursuant to
a request under paragraphs (F) or (G), have an oppor-
tunity to be heard at the hearing of an application made
pursuant to paragraph (E)(iii) of this Rule.(F) The State,
if it raises an objection pursuant to paragraph (D), on
the grounds that disclosure would prejudice its national
security interests, shall file a notice of objection not less
than five days before the date fixed for the hearing, spe-
cifying the grounds of objection. In its notice of objec-
tion the State:(i) shall identify, as far as possible, the
basis upon which it claims that its national security in-
terests will be prejudiced; and(ii) may request the Judge
or Trial Chamber to direct that appropriate protective
measures be made for the hearing of the objection, in-
cluding in particular:(a) hearing the objection in camera
and ex parte;(b) allowing documents to be submitted in
redacted form, accompanied by an affidavit signed by a
senior State official explaining the reasons for the redac-
tion;(c) ordering that no transcripts be made of the hear-
ing and that documents not further required by the
Tribunal be returned directly to the State without being
filed with the Registry or otherwise retained.(G) With re-
gard to the procedure under paragraph (F) above, the
Judge or Trial Chamber may order the following pro-
tective measures for the hearing of the objection:(i) the
designation of a single Judge from a Chamber to exam-
ine the documents or hear submissions; and/or(ii) that
the State be allowed to provide its own interpreters for
the hearing and its own translations of sensitive
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this Rule shall not preclude a subsequent application by
the requesting party in respect of the same documents
or information if new circumstances arise.(I) An order
under this Rule may provide for the documents or infor-
mation in question to be produced by the State under
appropriate arrangements to protect its interests, which
may include those arrangements specified in paragraphs
(F)(ii) or (G).Once documents have been produced to a
party by a State pursuant to an order under Rule 54 bis,
they can be used in different manners. Such documents
may in general inform a party’s preparation for trial, but
oftentimes, a party will want to tender as evidence a
document received by a State. It is then that the party
must demonstrate that the document is susceptible to
being admitted into evidence at trial pursuant to Rule
89(C), which provides, “A Chamber may admit any rele-
vant evidence which it deems to have probative value.”
See IT/32/REV.21: Rule 89(C). This is by no means a
pro forma matter, because it is only after documents are
admitted into evidence that they form part of the record
of the trial and thus can be taken into account for pur-
poses of the judges’ deliberations and final judgement.
Moreover, documents obtained from a State can often
be considered to have a high degree of reliability, thus
possessing a high probative value.
37Stating that the Prosecution had issued 57 document
requests in connection with the Milošević trial, of which 32
were still pending, Prosecutor v. Milošević 13 December
2002, paras. 8–10 (requesting access to archives).
38Art. 18(2): The Prosecutor shall have the power to
question suspects, victims and witnesses, to collect evi-
dence and to conduct on-site investigations. In carrying
out these tasks, the Prosecutor may, as appropriate, seek
the assistance of the State authorities concerned.”; Rule
39:“In the conduct of an investigation, the Prosecutor
may: (i) summon and question suspects, victims and wit-
nesses and record their statements, collect evidence and
conduct on-site investigations; (ii) undertake such other
matters as may appear necessary for completing the in-
vestigation and the preparation and conduct of the pros-
ecution at the trial, including the taking of special
measures to provide for the safety of potential witnesses
and informants; (iii) seek, to that end, the assistance of
any State authority concerned, as well as of any relevant
international body including the International Criminal
Police Organization (INTERPOL); and (iv) request such
orders as may be necessary from a Trial Chamber or a
Judge.”
39Arguing, inter alia, that requests for access to
archives reveal logical inconsistency with specificity
requirement.
40Rule 54: “At the request of either party or proprio
motu, a Judge or a Trial Chamber may issue such orders,summonses, subpoenas, warrants and transfer orders as
may be necessary for the purposes of an investigation or
for the preparation or conduct of the trial.”
41The second decision was initially issued on a confi-
dential basis but subsequently made public. See Prosecu-
tor v. Milošević 15 September 2003, note 3; 18 June
2003.
42See, e.g. Prosecutor v. Milošević 16 January 2004; 17
February 2004 (reporting on efforts to locate financial
documentation from the Ministry of Finance and Econ-
omy of Republic of Serbia, documentation relating to
Joint Command for Kosovo, documentation related to
Novi Sad Corps, letter from Radovan Karadžić to Zoran
Lilić regarding dismissal of generals of Bosnia Serb
Army, and documentation relating to training of volun-
teers in special units of the Yugoslav Army); 23 February
2004 (reporting further on financial documentation).
43These were Zdenko Tomanović and Dragoslav Ogn-
janović. See Hearing 10 April 2002, T.2797.
44This was Branko Rakić, Senior Lecturer at the Fac-
ulty of Law at the University of Belgrade. See Prosecutor
v. Milošević 23 October 2003b.
45This was Professor Mischa Wladimiroff. See Pros-
ecutor v. Milošević 10 October 2002, p. 4.
46This was Professor Timothy McCormack from
Australia. See Prosecutor v. Milošević 22 November
2002a.
47For a comprehensive substantive discussion on judi-
cial decisions regarding self-representation, see Boas
2006.
48The Trial Chamber was informed by United Nations
Detention Unit that Milošević would not be present in
court that day because he had complained of exhaustion
and that a medical report was being obtained. Hearing 1
November 2002, T.12727. Milošević had previously been
unable to attend court due to ill health on 18–28 March
2002, 17–27 June 2002, and 18–19 July 2002.
49Rule 80 (Control of Proceedings) reads:(A) The Trial
Chamber may exclude a person from the courtroom in
order to protect the right of the accused to a fair and
public trial, or to maintain the dignity and decorum of
the proceedings.(B) The Trial Chamber may order the
removal of an accused from the courtroom and continue
the proceedings in the absence of the accused if the ac-
cused has persisted in disruptive conduct following a
warning that such conduct may warrant the removal of
the accused from the courtroom.
50An example of some of these documents, subject to
the admission of which the Prosecution had closed its
case, were the minutes and stenographic notes of the
FRY’s Supreme Defence Council. In June 2004, after the
close of the Prosecution case and before the start of the
defence case, the Chamber issued a decision finding that
the Prosecution had demonstrated the relevance of two
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them to be admitted into evidence, and noting that it
would issue another decision with respect to the remain-
der of the SDC materials in due course. See Prosecutor
v. Milošević 23 September 2004a, pp. 2–4 (noting that
the Trial Chamber issued a confidential version of its
decision on 11 June 2004). In September, the Chamber
issued its second decision with respect to the admissibil-
ity of the SDC materials, in which it granted admission
to the remainder of the SDC materials. See Prosecutor v.
Milošević 23 September 2004b, p. 4.
51For a comprehensive analysis of the motion for
judgment for acquittal, see Gaparayi 2004, pp. 737–766.
52In respect of the allegations challenged by the Amici
Curiae in the three indictments, the Prosecution conceded
that for some of them there was no or insufficient evi-
dence to meet the legal standard required under Rule 98
bis and did not object to a judgment of acquittal being
entered in respect of these allegations. However, many of
the challenges were not conceded by the Prosecution. See
Prosecutor v. Milošević 3 May 2004, p. 25, et seq (Kosovo),
p. 61, et seq (Croatia), and p. 174, et seq (Bosnia).
53The Indictment can be found in Annex A of Pros-
ecutor v. Milošević 22 November 2002b.
54The Indictment can be found attached to Prosecutor
v. Milošević 26 July 2004a.
55Noting that pro se liaison officer had filed submis-
sion on behalf of Milošević requesting admission of
documents tendered as evidence through witness Obrad
Stevanović and setting forth arguments in support of
their admission into evidence.
56Requiring also Registrar to identify counsel who
might be assigned to case.
57See Rule 90 (H) of the 13 December 2001 version
reads:(i) Cross-examination shall be limited to the
subject-matter of the evidence-in-chief and matters af-
fecting the credibility of the witness and, where the
witness is able to give evidence relevant to the case for
the cross-examining party, to the subject-matter of that
case.(ii) In the cross-examination of a witness who is able
to give evidence relevant to the case for the cross-
examining party, counsel shall put to that witness the
nature of the case of the party for whom that counsel
appears which is in contradiction of the evidence given by
the witness.(iii) The Trial Chamber may, in the exercise of
its discretion, permit enquiry into additional matters.
58Citing, in a “compare” signal, Prosecutor v. Blaškić 29
October 1997, para. 68 (citing New Zealand v. France,
p. 268, para. 46).
59Hearing 15 November 2005, T.46481–46484 (Milo-
šević noted that these three physicians were “profes-
sionals from Russia, France, and Serbia”).
60These reports were filed confidentially, but their
existence and the fact that they were filed before theTrial Chamber is a matter of public record. See Hearing
15 November 2005, T.46481–46484 (discussion of
procedural matters in open session).
61The Prosecution filed an Interim Response on 22
December 2005; see Prosecutor v. Milošević 22 December
2005a; see also Prosecutor v. Milošević 22 December 2005b.
62Although the attachments themselves are confiden-
tial, they are described in the Second Addendum, which
was filed publicly. See Second Addendum, para 5.
63See, e.g. Hearing 02 September 2004, T.25953:
“JUDGE MAY: Well, he has shown in cross-examination
that he has a great deal of material available to him, very
detailed cross-examination of a lot of witnesses, which
must have been based on material.” Later, during the
defence phase of the case, the Trial Chamber remarked
that Milošević could receive and send uncensored mail
and facsimile messages from and to his Legal Associates
on weekdays, conduct unmonitored communications by
telephone with his Legal Associates during all days of
the week, receive scheduled visits of his Legal Associates
during weekdays, make use of the photocopying facilities
of the UNDU, review video evidence on VCR at the UN
Detention Unit, use his own portable computer in the
UN Detention Unit, and, if he so wished, install a printer
to it. Prosecutor v. Milošević 22 September 2004, para.
65. While appearing in court, Milošević was allowed to
access a privileged phone line during the trial breaks and
could send facsimiles and use photocopying facilities if
urgently needed. Prosecutor v. Milošević 12 December
2005, p. 10, note 49.
64For a critical discussion, see Grosscup 2004, p. 355;
Steinitz 2005, pp. 103–123; Harvard International
Review 2006.
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